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# AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study

## Main Report Volume I

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### **DISCLAIMER**

**The findings and recommendations of this report are not to be construed as official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision unless so designated by other official Army documentation. The report is an impartial evaluation of the Active Component/Army National Guard Integrated Division Concept and is not intended as an endorsement for any specific course of action.**

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## *Executive Summary*

On May 23, 1996, the Secretary of the Army approved the results of the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study. An integral part of the results called for two AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions. Each AC/ARNG Integrated Division would consist of three ARNG Enhanced Readiness Brigades and an active component (AC) division headquarters. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was tasked to conduct a viability assessment of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept and focus on merits and implementation issues.

Three proposed alternatives were developed to satisfy the intent of the Secretary of the Army:

- Alternative 1 was an AC AOE division HHC, a division base (decremented to avoid redundancies contained within the brigades), and three assigned ERBs.
- Alternative 2 was an AC table of distribution and allowances (TDA) HHC and three assigned ERBs. The division HHC does not deploy with the ERBs.
- Alternative 3 was an AOE division with an AC HHC. The assigned ERBs are reconfigured to task organized AOE designs.

A key component of the analysis focused on a review of the existing laws and regulations and their impact on the proposed organizations. The results of the review showed that statutory and regulatory issues centered on the authority of the division commander, the use of units within the division, and the use of funds. There are *no legal show stoppers*. However, there are differing views on how to implement the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept. Both views make use of a memorandum of agreement between affected parties until such time as more permanent solutions are developed.

Other areas examined included: doctrine, organizational analysis, an examination of pre mobilization training requirements; post mobilization training; and resource analysis.

Selected CINCs were also queried about their possible concerns regarding post mobilization training times for the ERBs and the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions. While each CINC saw utility and merit in the concept, they stated that heavy forces arriving in theater after M+90 were of limited use to the warfight.

HQDA ODCSOPS War Plans Division used various sources and models to determine the impacts of producing AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions rather than ERBs. The overall results of this analysis are classified. The unclassified results show that AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions arrive in theater to support the latter stages of the warfight for a dual MRC scenario. Their arrival does not come without an associated cost — a change in the ARNG force structure (for alternatives 1 & 3, only two heavy ERBs remain in the force vice eight); alternatives 1 & 3 cause a delay in deployment of other units required for the warfight (caused by competition for training resources or strategic lift); and a larger

CS/CSS tail to doctrinally support a division in theater vice the CS/CSS tail required to support ERBs. In addition, changes will be required to the current DPG and to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

The resource analysis reviewed pre and post mobilization personnel requirements, procurement costs, and operating tempo (OPTEMPO) costs. All three alternatives generate increased personnel requirements for implementation. In addition, Alternatives 1 and 3 generate additional pre and post mobilization training support requirements caused by the division base. Procurement cost are the least for Alternative 2 because it only has a division HHC; the other alternatives have requirements for division base units and thus have greater equipment requirements.

While there are issues that must be resolved prior to implementation and resources must be identified to support any of the alternatives, no show stoppers exist to preclude the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept from being viable. Alternative 2 emerged as the preferred alternative. Lower elements of expense; ease of implementation; meeting current DPG requirements; transitioning to other alternatives as required; and near term executability all contributed to this recommendation.

There is merit to the concept of an AC/ARNG Integrated Division. The concept provides a focused division HHC, tailored to provide command, control and training oversight exclusively to three ERBs. The focused, smaller span of control, tailored headquarters, and an experienced, dedicated commander and staff provide improved training readiness and lessens the risk of not meeting deployment time lines. Additionally, associated training distracters for the previously affiliated AC divisions is reduced. This provides the opportunity for a better trained total force and, therefore, reduces risk.

The bottom line is the concept has sufficient merit to test if the implementation issues are resolved. There is no reason, at present, to implement the more expensive alternatives. Standing up Alternative 2 provides the Army the opportunity to test the viability of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept through the lesser expensive method, resolve issues, determine the value added, and chart a future course for the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions. Therefore, the recommendations of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study are:

- Establish an implementation process action team (PAT) comprised of FORSCOM, ARNG and Army staff representatives to resolve implementation issues and investigate complementary methods of AC/ARNG integration; and,
- Stand up Alternative 2 initially.

Although an AOE heavy division was used for analytical purposes to ascertain the viability of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division, the exact composition of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division is left to the discretion of the PAT as it addresses the many issues

associated with implementation. An AOE heavy division should not be construed as the only way to achieve an AC/ARNG Integrated Division.

On August 6, 1997, the Study Director presented a decision briefing to the Secretary of the Army. The briefing outlined the major findings of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study, presented some implementation issues, and made a recommendation. The Secretary of the Army decisions were: stand up Alternative 2 (an AC division headquarters with 3 ERBs ) in the near term; make FORSCOM the lead organization for the implementation PAT; and request the greatest involvement from NGB and affected TAGs. The Secretary of the Army thanked the ARNG for presenting the AC/ARNG Integrated Division proposal to the Army and he thanked TRADOC for their effort in developing the concept and completing the detailed study. He highlighted that the process is clearly a path toward greater integration. "It will make a difference (to the Total Army)."



## Glossary

Acronym followed by definition

A2C2	Army Airspace Command and Control	ATCCS	Army Tactical Command and Control System
AAR	After-action Review	AVENGER	A Modernization of Air Defense Capability ongoing in the Army
AC	Active Component	BCBST	Brigade/Battalion Command Battle Staff Training
ACofS	Assistant Chief of Staff	BCT	Brigade Combat Team
ACofS, G-1	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (Personnel)	BCTP	Battle Command Training Program
ACofS, G-3	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Plans and Operations)	BLTM	Battalion Level Training Model
ACOM	Atlantic Command	BOS	Battlefield Operating System
ACR	Armored Cavalry Regiment	BPC	Battle Projection Center
ADA	Air Defense Artillery	BUR	Bottom Up Review
ADC	Assistant Division Commander	C1	Highest Level of Readiness Capability for a Unit
ADRS	Army National Guard Divisional Redesign Study	C2	Command and Control
AGR	Active Guard and Reserve	C4	Command, Control, Communications and Computers
AH-64D	Attack Helicopter 64 - D model (Also Called the Apache)	C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
ALO	Authorized Level of Organization	CA	Combat Arms
ANGCRRA	Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992	CALFEX	Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise
AOE	Army of Excellence	CATS	Combined Arms Training Strategy
APOE	Air Port of Embarkation	CCM	Control Countermeasures
AR	Army Regulation	C-E	Communications and Electronics
ARNG	Army National Guard		
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program		
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point		
AT	Annual Training		

CEAC	Cost and Economic Analysis Center (FOA of HQDA)	FDD	Force Design Directorate, HQ TRADOC
CEWI	Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence	FEB	Field Exercise Brigades
CFL	Coordinated Fire Line	FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
CFP	Contingency Force Pool	FM	Field Manual
CINC	Commander-in-Chief	FMTV	Family of Modernized Tactical Vehicles
COMEX	Communications Exercise	FORCES	Force Organization Cost Estimating System
COMSEC	Communications Security	FORMDEPS	Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment System
CONUSA	Continental U.S. Army	FORSCOM	US Army Forces Command
CORM	Commission on Roles and Missions	FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
COTS	Commercial Off The Shelf	FSCL	Fire Support Coordination Line
CP	Command Post	FSCoord	Fire Support Coordinator
CPX	Command Post Exercise	FSE	Fire Support Element
CS	Combat Support	FSP	Force Support Package
CSCE	Communication System Control Element	FTX	Field Training Exercise
CSS	Combat Service Support	GFRE	Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement
CTC	Combat Training Centers	GS	General Support
CY	Calendar Year	HHC	Headquarters and Headquarters Company
DISCOM	Division Support Command	HN	Host Nation
DIVARTY	Division Artillery	HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
DMMC	Division Material Management Center	IDT	Inactive Duty Training
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance	IEW	Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
DS	Direct Support	JAG	Judge Advocate General
ECM	Electronic Countermeasures	JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
EEA	Essential Elements of Analysis	JTF	Joint Task Force
ERB	Enhanced Readiness Brigades	LIN	Line Item Number
EW	Electronic Warfare	LOGEX	Logistics Exercise
FASCAM	Family of Scatterable Mines	MAPEX	Map Exercise
FCX	Fire Coordination Exercise	MBA	Main Battle Area
		M-Day	Mobilization Day
		METL	Mission Essential Task List

MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System	PSP	Power Support Platform
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement	RAH-66	Attack Helicopter 66 (Also Called the Commanche)
MOPP	Mission-oriented Protective Posture	RC	Reserve Component
MOS-Q	Military Occupation Specialty Qualification	RCAS	Reserve Component Automation System
MRC	Major Regional Conflict	RCUCH	Reserve Component Unit Commander's Handbook
MSC	Major Subordinate Command	RTB	Regional Training Brigades
MTP	Mission Training Plan	RTD	Regional Training Detachment
MTT	Mobile Training Team	RTT	Regional Training Team
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical	SARSS	Standard Army Retail Supply System
NGB	National Guard Bureau	SATS	Standard Army Training System
NMS	National Military Strategy	SCC	System Control Center
ODCSOPS	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, HQDA	SCP	Survey Control Point
OOTW	Operations Other Than War	SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
OPFOR	Opposing Forces	SIDPERS	Standard Installation Division Personnel System
OPLAN	Operation Plan	SINCGARS	Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
OPORD	Operation Order	SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
OPSEC	Operations Security	SPOE	Sea Port of Embarkation
OPTEMPO	Operating Tempo	SRC	Standard Requirements Code
OTJAG	Office of The Judge Advocate General	STX	Situation Training Exercise
OTOE	Objective Table of Organization and Equipment	TADSS	Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations
PAC	Personnel Administrative Center	TAG	The Adjutant General
PAT	Process Action Team	TCF	Tactical Combat Force
PIR	Priority Information Requirements	TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
POL	Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants	TOC	Tactical Operations Center
POM	Program Objective Memorandum		
PPP	Power Projection Platform		

TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment	USAR	United States Army Reserve
TRADOC	US Army Training and Doctrine Command	USPFO	U.S. Property and Fiscal Officer
TRM	Training Resource Model	VCSA	Vice Chief of Staff. Army
TSP	Training Support Package	WARTRACE	Term used by Army to describe the relationship between a unit and it's useage in a War Plan.
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures	WFC	Warfighting Center
U.S.C.	U.S. Code	WFX	Warfighter Exercises
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice		
ULLS	Unit Level Logistical System		

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## *Study Overview*

### **STUDY BACKGROUND.**

In August 1995, the Army initiated the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS) in response to the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) recommendations. Part of the results from ADRS, approved by the Secretary of the Army on 23 May 1996, proposed forming two integrated divisions. Each integrated division would consist of an active component headquarters and three enhanced readiness brigades (ERBs) acting as the maneuver elements of the division. Subsequent to the Secretary of the Army approval, the Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) tasked the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to conduct an assessment of the integrated division concept to determine the viability of the concept. Specifically, TRADOC was tasked to:

- *Conduct an assessment* of the integrated division proposal to determine the viability of the concept, addressing doctrine, organization, training, mobilization, and warfighting impacts;
- *Present a recommendation* to the senior army leadership on the merits of the concept and how to proceed with the concept; and
- *Fully document* all facets of the TRADOC assessment.

The outcome of the study would be a recommendation to the senior Army leadership on the merits of the concept and a recommendation on how to proceed.

Figure - 1 shows the Army National Guard force structure as it exists today (eight ARNG divisions, 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades (ERBs), and three Separate brigades) and post Army National Guard Division Redesign (eight ARNG divisions (three combat without change, three combat with an ERB replacing one of the brigades, and two composite), six composite brigades, six stand alone ERBs and two AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions (comprised of three ERBs each and an AC division headquarters). The focus of the TRADOC effort is the viability of the two AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions.




Figure - 1 TRADOC Study Effort

**STUDY SCOPE.**

The force structure under examination in this study included the 15 ERBs at their approved 2003 end state; the Army of Excellence (AOE) designs for a standard heavy division; and the emerging force designs from Force XXI. The analysis also included the current doctrine for heavy divisions and separate brigades and the current training requirements for both heavy divisions and separate brigades. Warfighting impacts included the requirements envisioned by the CINCs to successfully execute their respective war plans. The end strength and force structure allowances for both the Active and Reserve components were not the focus of the analysis and remain as stated in the most recent program objective memorandum (POM). e.g., the End Strengths are 495,000 (495K) for the active component and 366,758 (367K) for the ARNG. Stationing of the 15 ERBs remains unchanged from their current locations and is the responsibility of the Army National Guard; Chief of Staff. Army retains stationing authority.

Although an AOE heavy division was used for analytical purposes to determine the viability of the concept for an AC/ARNG Integrated Division, it should not be construed that an AOE heavy division is the only way to achieve an integrated division. Other alternative designs exist — light divisions and TRICAP divisions to name two — but were beyond the scope of this study. The exact composition of an AC/ARNG Integrated Division, therefore, will be determined during the implementation phase. It should also be noted that selection of an AOE heavy division for concept viability analysis maximized the resource implications in

terms of both personnel and equipment as well as in terms of deployment requirements.

### **METHODOLOGY.**

The study utilized a combination of analytical techniques to evaluate each alternative fairly on its own merits. A draft study plan was developed and approved by the Deputy Commander, TRADOC. The study plan identified those elements deemed necessary to stand up the division. As the study plan unfolded, it was recognized that the TRADOC Force Design Directorate (FDD), as the lead study agency, did not have the ability to singularly complete the study. Several subjects of interest crossed boundaries into areas not within FDD's areas of familiarity or expertise. Stationing requirements, training requirements, resource determinations, and legal determinations required participation from other TRADOC agencies, FORSCOM agencies, and Department of the Army staff. Ultimately, roles and requirements for these agencies were clearly identified and incorporated in the study plan. Finally, given the amount of work required, the short time available to complete the study, and the relative shortage of government personnel available to do the work, FDD diverted a significant portion of the study workload to appropriate government contractors possessing the needed expertise. This decision ultimately lead to contracts with PROSOFT, C<sup>2</sup>I, CALIBRE corporations, and support from RAND Arroyo Center, a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC). Figure - 2 graphically portrays the methodology utilized to answer the study questions, capture study findings, identify required resources, provide study recommendations, and identify implementation strategies.




Figure - 2 Study Methodology

### ALTERNATIVE FORCE STRUCTURES.

Three alternatives were proposed to satisfy the intent of the Secretary of the Army. These proposed alternatives (shown in Figure - 3) were used as the basis for the doctrinal, organizational, training, mobilization, warfighting impacts, and resource analyses for assessing the viability of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept. The organizations shown in white are AC e.g., the division Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC); those shown in solid gray are ARNG (e.g., the maneuver brigades); and the organizations outlined in dashes are undecided (e.g., the division base).




Figure - 3 Study Alternatives

#### Alternative 1.

Alternative 1 consists of an Active Component (AC) Army of Excellence (AOE) division HHC, a division base (decremented to the extent possible to avoid redundancies contained within the brigades), and three assigned ERBs. The ERBs retain their identity and do not reconfigure from ERBs to divisional maneuver brigades unless called to do so during post mobilization. If the alternative 1 division is assigned a division mission, the ERBs must reconfigure to AOE designs.

*Alternative 2.*

Alternative 2 consists of an AC table of distribution and allowances (TDA) HHC and three assigned ERBs. The division HHC does not deploy with the ERBs and the ERBs retain their identity both pre and post mobilization. The division HHC remains available to operate a warfighting center during post mobilization.

*Alternative 3.*

Alternative 3 is an AOE division with an AC HHC. The assigned ERBs are reconfigured to task organized AOE designs. The division base is decremented to the extent necessary to provide the task organization required by the brigades for training purposes. There are no redundancies and the division does not reconfigure if mobilized to perform a divisional mission. The division can dispatch task organized brigades for brigade sized missions.

*Force Structure Observations.*

*Alternative 1* is the most complex alternative because it must reconfigure from ERBs into AOE divisional maneuver brigade organizations when the alternative 1 division is alerted for a divisional mission. At a minimum, reconfiguration results in movement of some personnel and requires administrative storage or some security measures for redundant equipment.

In *Alternative 2*, the ERBs will always remain organized and equipped for sustained, semi-independent operations under corps control. They may be used to serve as a planning headquarters for contingency operations, to fight as a divisional brigade, to fight under corps command, or to serve as corps reserve. Employment as a division, however, is not possible under this alternative.

In *Alternative 3*, the ERBs must reconfigure to task organized AOE divisional brigades immediately, thus losing their identity as ERBs and a Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) resource. Peacetime, pre mobilization stationing will most probably be in a task organized manner.

All three alternatives retain the ability to perform state missions under specified authority.

**DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS.**

Army doctrine, as a whole, is embodied in various levels of doctrinal publications. These levels of doctrinal publications begin with fundamental principles and

proceed to more detailed guidance at each succeeding level. This detailed guidance is comprised of three categories: tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

- Doctrinal principles apply to military forces (operating) in support of national objectives and are used to guide actions.
- Tactics apply to employment of units in combat and the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or the enemy.
- Techniques are the methods used by troops and/or commanders to perform assigned missions and functions.
- Procedures provide a standard and detailed courses of action that describe how to perform a task.

A comparative analysis of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives against the doctrinal publications which provide the warfighting doctrine for each alternative when it is employed in a theater of operations shows that each alternative can be supported by existing doctrine. FM 71-100, *Division Operations*, does not apply to Alternative 2 because the division command and control element above the enhanced brigade is a TDA organization.

### **ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS.**

The analytical review indicates that all three alternatives for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division are viable and will work.

**Alternative 1** is the most complicated alternative. It consists of an AC division HHC responsible for coordination and supervision of training activities of three assigned ERBs during peacetime. It also has a standard division base. This division base was decremented, where possible, to account for redundancies contained within the assigned ERBs. In some cases, however, redundancies exist because certain elements of the division base are required for training purposes. The alternative 1 organization has the advantage of preserving ERBs for separate missions and for peacetime command and control. However, it is more difficult to deploy as a division due to the need to reconfigure at time of mobilization and the need to store redundant equipment.

**Alternative 2** is the most simple alternative. It consists of an AC TDA division HHC responsible for coordination and training activities of three assigned ERBs. This coordination and training is focused on peacetime, mobilization, and post mobilization. It would end at the point in time when the brigades deploy to a port of embarkation (either an APOE or and SPOE) for commitment to their stated wartime/OOTW missions. The division TDA HHC never deploys, but remains available to operate a warfighting center and to conduct training of follow-on forces. As a result, the division HHC has a non-standard (non-TOE)

configuration to account for mission requirements. Alternative 2 has the advantage of preserving the ERBs for separate missions and peacetime training. However, it has the disadvantage of never being able to be employed as a division, thus losing the synergism built over a period of time.

**Alternative 3** consists of an AOE division design with an AC division HHC. The division is responsible for coordination and supervision of training activities during peacetime, mobilization, and after mobilization. When committed, the Alternative 3 division functions as a standard AOE division. Under some circumstances, the division may not be required to totally deploy, but to provide task organized brigades as required. The Alternative 3 division has the advantages of always training with habitually associated organizations, already being in a division configuration when mobilized for division missions, and not having redundancies in personnel or equipment. Its disadvantages are the loss of separate brigade structure to the respective state National Guard structures and the loss of six ERBs from the 15 identified in the base force established in the Bottom Up Review.

*Organizational analysis observations.*

- Approved TOE designs are applicable to Alternative 1. The total personnel requirement and the equipment density are the highest of the three alternatives due to unavoidable redundancies within the brigade and division base organizations that are required for peacetime existence.
- Approved TOE designs are applicable to the Alternative 2 ERBs only. The AOE division HHC TOE is not appropriate for the mission because there is a significant misalignment of functions. The training-only mission of the division HHC requires replacement of the AOE division HHC.
- Approved TOE designs are applicable to Alternative 3. Stationing will most likely occur by locating a task organized brigade within a geographic area; hence the division base will appear decremented. (The personnel savings achieved by this alternative, when compared to Alternative 1, will be the result of the brigades converting to AOE designs during peacetime, rather than retaining the ERB design.)
- Significant force structure must be generated to establish the division base for Alternatives 1 and 3.

**STATUTORY, REGULATORY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DATA FLOW.**

The analysis in this area focused on a review of the existing laws and regulations and how they impact on the proposed AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions. The

results of the review showed that statutory and regulatory issues centered on the authority of the division commander, the use of units within the division, and the use of funds. There are no legal show stoppers; however, there are differing views on how to implement the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept. The diagram below shows two options for instituting command and control for the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions. Both options make use of a memorandum of agreement between affected parties until such time as more permanent regulations can be published on the Federal side and more permanent agreements can be made between states and the Federal participants.




Figure - 4 Command & Control Options

### PRE MOBILIZATION TRAINING.

The examination of pre mobilization training requirements found that Section 1113, Title XI effectively outlines the pre mobilization training goals for each of the three alternative designs for the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions. Further examination found that the strategy to accomplish these goals can be found in FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2 (*Reserve Component Training in America's Army*), Army Field Manual 25-100 (*Training the Force*), and Army Field Manual 25-101 (*Battle Focused Training*). There also appears to be no reason to exempt ERBs from performing state missions, nor is there any precedents or mechanism to accomplish such actions. Standard leader development requirements — Institutional Training, Organizational Experiences, and Self Development — appear to offer no major management obstacles for any of the three AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives.

**POST MOBILIZATION TRAINING.**

An integral part of the post mobilization training analysis was the RAND effort to develop post mobilization training requirements for ARNG divisions. Expanding on their earlier effort, *Mobilization and Train-Up Times for Army Reserve Combat Units*, RAND developed and analyzed three strategies for post mobilization training for ARNG divisions. The three strategies were then subjected to review by senior Army trainers for comment. The RAND effort provides sound training strategies, to include identifying time to train requirements, resource requirements, and the risk assumed for each of the three strategies. Figure - 5 shows the three strategies and the comments by the senior Army leaders.




Figure - 5 Post Mobilization Training Strategies

Division training strategies range from the higher risk Strategy A that provides the first division in approximately M+132 days and the second division in approximately M+217 days to the more conservative strategy (Strategy C) that provides both divisions simultaneously in M+239 days. However, only Strategy C permits the use of one heavy warfighting center to train other ERBs for the fight.

Selected CINCs - CINCUNC, CINCUSAREUR, and CINCCENT - were also queried about their possible concerns regarding post mobilization training times for the ERBs and the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions. Each CINC saw utility in Alternative 2 and felt it had merit. However, they stated that heavy forces

arriving in theater after M+90 were of limited use to the warfight and provide limited value.

### ***FORCE IMPLICATIONS.***

HQDA ODCSOPS War Plans Division used the results of the RAND study, the current DPG, the Total Army Analysis results, and the United States Army Concepts Analysis transportation model (TRANSMO) to determine the impacts of producing AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions rather than ERBs. The results of this analysis are classified. The results do show that AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions arrive in theater to support the latter stages of the warfight for a dual MRC scenario. However, their arrival does not come without an associated cost — a change in the ARNG force structure (only two heavy ERBs remain in the force vice eight); a delay in deployment of other units required for the warfight (caused by competition for training resources or strategic lift); and a larger CS/CSS tail required to doctrinally support a division in theater vice the CS/CSS tail required to support ERBs. In addition, selection of certain alternatives and post mobilization training strategies will require adjustments to the current DPG and to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

### ***RESOURCE ANALYSIS.***

The resource analysis reviewed pre and post mobilization personnel requirements, procurement costs, and operating tempo (OPTEMPO) costs. In addition, the resource analysis reviewed mission travel requirements and the EAD/EAC CS/CSS tail required to support an AC/ARNG Integrated Division in theater. All three alternatives generate increased personnel requirements for implementation. Alternative 2 generates the least; Alternative 1 the most because of redundancy between the ERBs and the division base. In addition, Alternatives 1 and 3 generate additional post mobilization training support requirements caused by the division base. Procurement cost were the least for Alternative 2 because it only has a division HHC; the other alternatives have requirements for division base units and thus have greater equipment requirements. All three alternatives will also generate larger than usual mission travel budgets because of the geographic separation of the units within the AC/ARNG Integrated Division and the frequency of travel for the staff. Alternatives 1 and 3 generate GFRE requirements over and above those that exist today as well as additional post mobilization requirements. The additional GFRE and post mobilization requirements are over and above the AC spaces needed for the division HHC. In addition, Alternatives 1 and 3 require a larger doctrinal CS/CSS tail than for the ERBs. The resourcing for these CS/CSS requirements must be addressed through the Total Army Analysis process.

**CONCLUSION.**

Even though there are issues that must be resolved prior to implementation and resources must be identified to support any of the alternatives, no show stoppers exist to preclude the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept from being viable. The next step is selecting an alternative to stand up and test. Figure - 6 shows the study comparison of the three alternative designs for the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions. Based on the comparison of the alternatives, Alternative 2 emerges as the preferred Alternative because it:

- Is the least expensive - requires the fewest personnel and the least amount of equipment;
- Is the easiest to implement - only a division HHC must be formed;
- Meets the current DPG requirements - ERBs retain their current configuration;
- Facilitates future decisions - Alternative 2 allows transition to either Alternative 1 or Alternative 3 at some future date if required and appropriate; and
- Is executable in the near term

	Doctrine	Organization	Statutory	Pre Mob Tng	Post Mob Tng	Force Implications	Resources	Overall
Alternative 1	G	G	A	A	A	A	A	A
Alternative 2	G	G	A	G	G	G	G	A/G
Alternative 3	G	G	A	A	A	A	A	A

GREEN - no show stoppers  
 AMBER - issues to be resolved  
 RED - show stoppers exist

**STATUTORY** - Must resolve command, funding and data transfer

**PRE/POST MOB TNG** - Alts 1 & 3 train both Bde and Div missions, Alt 2 Bde only

**FORCE IMP** - Alt 1(as DIV) & 3 delay later deploying forces, generate additional CS/CSS tail, and not IAW current DPG (Div deployment)

**RESOURCES\*** - Alt 1 & 3 require significant additional resources for the Div bases

**\*Note:** May be offset by existing ARNG Force Structure

Figure - 6 Comparison of Alternatives for AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions

Selecting Alternative 2 for implementation demonstrates the Army's commitment to AC/RC integration — an area of Department of Defense and Congressional concern and has the potential to improve overall readiness of the ERBs and reduce the partnership impacts on AC units. Figure - 7 is a graphic summation of the study conclusions.

This study recognizes that other methods of AC/RC integration exist and should be considered. However, there is merit to the concept of an AC/ARNG Integrated Division. The concept provides a focused division HHC tailored to provide command, control and training oversight exclusively to three ERBs. The focused, smaller span of control, tailored headquarters, and an experienced, dedicated commander and staff provide improved training readiness and lessens the risk of not meeting deployment time lines. Additionally, the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept reduces the associated training distracters for the previously affiliated AC divisions. This provides the opportunity for a better trained total force and, therefore, reduces risk to the CINCs.

The 180 to 300 AC spaces for each of the division HHCs appear to be worth the investment for a field evaluation of the concept. However, the additional costs for division base units, a higher OPTEMPO, and an increased EAD combat support tail mitigate against either Alternatives 1 and 3 as the evaluated element. It, therefore, makes sense to assess Alternative 2, especially considering the current DPG does not identify requirements for additional divisions.

The bottom line is the concept has sufficient merit to test if the implementation issues identified in this study are resolved. There is no reason, at present, to implement the more expensive alternatives. Standing up Alternative 2 provides the Army the opportunity to test the viability of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept through the less expensive method, resolve issues, and determine the value added.




Figure - 7 Study Conclusion

## **RECOMMENDATION.**

The recommendation of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study is:

- Establish an implementation process action team (PAT) comprised of representatives of FORSCOM, ARNG and the Army staff. The PAT will be charged with resolving implementation issues and investigating complementary methods of AC/ARNG integration; and
- Stand up Alternative 2 initially. As the Army proceeds down the road, lessons learned from Alternative 2 implementation; impacts of Force XXI and Army After Next; ramifications from the QDR; adjustments from changes to the National Military Strategy; and changing world events will bring into clearer focus the future of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division organization.

Since the inception of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study, numerous concerns, recommendations, and alternative solutions have been identified as potential implementation issues. These issues have been captured and documented in the final report to facilitate a smooth transition from concept to fielding. Generally, these implementation issues can be categorized into four broad areas: ERB alignments/division HHC type and location; statutory and regulatory adjustments; funding streams for AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions; and complementary methods of AC/RC integration. Each of these areas are discussed in great detail in Chapter 10 of the basic report and in Appendix J. Some of the recommended statutory and regulatory adjustments include:

- Lines of authority/responsibility/accountability: State and Federal,
- Requirements for commissions within states,
- Role of USP&FO,
- Conduct of inspections,
- Rating chain responsibilities,
- School seat allocations/prioritization,
- Federal recognition boards,
- Military justice authority,
- Allocation of AC assets,
- Allocation/management of full time support: Title 32 and technicians, and
- Title XI: Training program, readiness, resources, equipment compatibility.

As noted earlier in the Study Scope, the PAT will also be charged with defining the exact composition of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division as it addresses implementation issues. Although an AOE heavy division was used in the analysis to determine concept viability, other designs may exist. The AOE heavy division should not be construed as the only way to achieve an AC/ARNG Integrated Division.

***SECRETARY OF THE ARMY DECISION.***

On August 6, 1997, the Study Director presented a decision briefing to the Secretary of the Army. The briefing outlined the major findings of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study, and made a recommendation. Based on the study findings and the analysis, the Secretary of the Army made the following decisions:

- Stand up Alternative 2 (an Active Component headquarters with 3 ERBs) in the near term;
- Establish an implementation PAT lead by FORSCOM to resolve issues; and
- If appropriate, transition to either Alternative 1 or Alternative 3 in the long term.

In addition, the Secretary of the Army requested that the NGB and affected state adjutants general be involved in the implementation process. He also reminded the parties that the CINCs are the ultimate users and must be kept informed of the results of this study and implementation progress. The Secretary of the Army reiterated that the major strong point of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division is the process, and not the end state, and that the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions must achieve the greatest and most useful form of integration.

The Secretary of the Army thanked the ARNG for presenting the AC/ARNG Integrated Division proposal to the Army and he thanked TRADOC for their effort in developing the concept and completing the detailed study. He highlighted that the process is clearly a path toward greater integration. "It will make a difference (to the Total Army.)"

## **Chapter One INTRODUCTION**

### ***1.1 AC/ARNG INTEGRATION - AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.***

#### ***1.1.1 Revolutionary War - Spanish American War.***

The issue of integration of active and National Guard forces can be traced back to the post Revolutionary War period. The Militia Act of 1792 left the states to their own discretion on questions of militia training, leadership, and deferments. What was not answered was the relationship between the militia and the regular Army. In the War of 1812, President Madison approved an army composed primarily of militiamen; however, some states opposed the war and refused to participate on constitutional grounds. In 1820, Secretary of War Calhoun proposed to "skeletonize" the peacetime army around a cadre force serving as its own nucleus for wartime expansion. Militia personnel would participate; militia units would not. During the Mexican War in 1848, Congress authorized the use of the militia for one year; however, no units were called because of the constitutional issues of serving on foreign soil. Only volunteers were accepted for deployment to Mexico. The Militia Act of 1862 obligated all men between the ages of 18 and 45 to participate in the militia and authorized the President to call state forces to active duty for nine months; however, the Enrollment Act of 1863 bypassed the militia clauses of the Constitution by asserting federal military service. The war with Spain in 1898 brought another challenge to integration efforts. The Regular Army proposed expansion of a federally organized and controlled force. Congress, however, authorized a Regular Army force supplemented by militia volunteers and any whole militia units wishing to volunteer. Individual states could raise new forces as needed and appoint officers as required. General officers and officers serving in higher headquarters, however, could only be commissioned and assigned by the federal government.

#### ***1.1.2 World War I.***

In 1903, the first major revision in 111 years occurred to militia laws — the Dick Act. National Guard units drilling at least 24 times a year and attending a 5-day annual training period received arms and equipment at federal expense. Furthermore, qualifying National Guard units could be periodically inspected by Regular Army officers and Regular Army officers could be detailed to National Guard units. The Act also provided that National Guard members were entitled to the same pay as Regular Army personnel while serving on active duty and were subject to federal regulations and the Articles of War. During World War I, the

President was authorized to appoint all officers, to include those in the National Guard. Not until the National Defense Act of 1920 was there a compromise between the War Department and the National Guard on the use of militia soldiers. Congress did not recognize the use of expandable cadre forces and organized the National Guard into divisions. The Act also restated that the National Guard was an integral part of the Army. The National Defense Act of 1920 did not, however, guarantee the integrity of National Guard forces activated for federal service.

#### *1.1.3 World War II - Viet Nam War.*

In 1939 the Army consisted of nine Regular Army and 18 National Guard Divisions. All divisions contained obsolete World War I vintage equipment and were significantly understrength. The United States considered several measures to improve military preparedness, however, until the German western offensive in May, 1940, Congress declined to vote the appropriations necessary to field the Army to full authorized strength. During 1940 and 1941, the Army's initial frantic efforts to integrate Regular Army, reservists, guardsmen, and draftees resulted in low morale, complaints of perceived discrimination by draftees assigned to National Guard units, and resentment from National Guardsmen because Regular Army officers were assigned to National Guard units. However, throughout the war the situation improved. Additionally, three National Guard regiments were employed as roundout units for the 7th, 8th, and 25th Infantry Divisions. The Guard units deployed and fought with their parent divisions until inactivated at the end of the war. During the Korean War, National Guardsmen were used as individual replacements for active units and only two pure National Guard divisions would see action in Korea. The same situation existed in the Viet Nam War. National Guard soldiers were used primarily as individual replacements to Regular Army units but strictly on a volunteer basis. Some battalion-size National Guard units saw action in Viet Nam but only after extensive cross-leveling actions had occurred because of readiness problems.

#### *1.1.4 Total Force Policy.*

In 1973, Secretary of Defense Laird issued a memorandum outlining a "Total Force Policy." This policy was designed to offset reductions in the defense budget and to increase reliance on the Reserve Component forces in the event of a national emergency. No longer would it be possible to employ forces in the Nation's defense without using Reserve Component forces. Two outcomes from the Total Force Policy were roundout National Guard brigades and the transfer of support functions to the reserves. By the mid 1980's, half of all active component division had either roundout battalions or brigades and two thirds of the Army's

support capability resided in the reserves. Today, there are no roundout combat units but reliance on the reserves for support capability remains.

The Total Army deployed in support of operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. National Guard units played a significant role in the success of the operations. Numerous combat support and combat service support units from both the National Guard and Army Reserve deployed and performed their assigned missions well. Three National Guard brigades were activated and trained in preparation for deployment, however, they did not deploy.

## ***1.2. BACKGROUND.***

### ***1.2.1 General.***

The intent of our National Military Strategy (NMS) is to respond to two major regional conflicts (MRCs) almost simultaneously to halt and then defeat an aggressor. Achieving a Total Army force capable of meeting the two MRC requirement demands adapting the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Army Reserve (USAR) to this new defense strategy, improving and accelerating the process of readying combat forces for deployment, and utilizing the ARNG and USAR in areas where they have performed effectively and efficiently.

### ***1.2.2 THE BOTTOM UP REVIEW (BUR).***

In October 1993, the Department of Defense completed a comprehensive review of the nation's defense strategy, the force structure that would be required to execute the strategy, modernization efforts supporting the force structure, the underlying infrastructure of the force structure, and the foundations underpinning the forces. To execute the strategy envisioned by the BUR and to respond to fast evolving regional conflicts in the future, the BUR included 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades (ERB) from the ARNG as part of its base force. These 15 ERBs would be organized and resourced so that they could be mobilized, trained, and deployed in 90 days or less to reinforce active combat units.

### ***1.2.3 The Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM).***

In 1995, a Congressionally mandated panel was chartered to review the roles and missions of the Armed Forces. As part of their findings, the CORM questioned the ability of the ERBs to be ready in 90 days or less to meet the deployment schedules associated with the 2 MRC scenario. The CORM further recommended

a “greater integration and cooperation between Active and Reserve Components...The most effective Reserve units have strong, recurring association and cooperation with Active components.” The CORM went on to state that “The Active components - given appropriate authority to establish standards and conduct evaluations and inspections - should be held responsible for Reserve Component training readiness.”

#### 1.2.4 The ARNG Division Redesign Study.

In August 1995, the Army initiated a study to respond to the CORM recommendations. Part of the results from the ARNG Division Redesign Study was a proposal to form two integrated divisions. Each integrated division would consist of an active component headquarters and three ERBs acting as the maneuver elements of the division. This proposal was approved by the Secretary of the Army in a 23 May 1996 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense. Subsequent to the Secretary of the Army’s approval, the Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) tasked the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to conduct an assessment of the integrated division concept to determine the viability of the concept (Appendix A). The outcome of the study would be a recommendation to the senior Army leadership on the merits of the concept and a recommendation on how to proceed.

A graphical representation of the Army’s response to the CORM is at Figure 1-1.




Figure 1-1 Army's Response to CORM Recommendations

### **1.3 DATA SOURCES.**

- John T. Nelson, *General George C. Marshall: Strategic Leadership and the Challenges of Reconstituting the Army, 1939-41*. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, February 1993.
- *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces*. RAND, 1992.
- Leonid Kondratiuk, History and Principles of Roundout and Capstone. Appendix B, *Closing Ranks: The Secret of Army Active and Reserve Component Harmony*, David E. Shaver, February 11, 1992.
- *A Historical Review of AC/RC Mobilization, Deployment and Training*, United States Training and Doctrine Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, November 1996.

### **1.4. OBJECTIVES.**

Guidance provided by the VCSA (Appendix A) tasked TRADOC to:

- Conduct an assessment of the integrated division proposal to determine the viability of the concept, addressing doctrine, organization, training, mobilization, and warfighting impacts;
- Present a recommendation to the senior Army leadership on the merits of the concept and how to proceed with the concept; and
- Fully document all facets of the TRADOC assessment.

### **1.5. SCOPE.**

The force structure under examination in this study included the 15 ERBs at their approved 2003 end state; the Army of Excellence (AOE) designs for a standard heavy division; and the emerging force designs from Force XXI. The analysis also included the current doctrine for heavy divisions and separate brigades and the current training requirements for both heavy divisions and separate brigades. Warfighting impacts included the requirements envisioned by the CINCs to successfully execute their respective war plans. The end strength and force structure allowances for both the Active and Reserve components were not the focus of the analysis and remain as stated in the most recent budget and program

objective memorandum (POM) e.g., the FY 97 Budgeted End Strengths are 495,000 (495K) for the active component and 366,758 (367K) for the ARNG. Stationing of the 15 ERBs remains unchanged from their current locations and is the responsibility of the Army National Guard; Chief of Staff, Army retains stationing authority.

Although an AOE heavy division was used for analytical purposes to determine the viability of the concept for an AC/ARNG Integrated Division, it should not be construed that an AOE heavy division is the only way to achieve an integrated division. Other alternative designs exist — light divisions and TRICAP divisions to name two — but were beyond the scope of this study. The exact composition of an AC/ARNG Integrated Division, therefore, will be determined during the implementation phase. It should also be noted that selection of an AOE heavy division for concept viability analysis maximized the resource implications in terms of both personnel and equipment as well as in terms of deployment requirements.

#### ***1.6. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS (EEA).***

The EEA for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study were constantly under scrutiny. The examination of the EEA centered on three main areas:

- **Clarity** - Do the EEA *clearly* and *accurately* reflect the intent? Can the EEA be answered and/or within the context of the study?
- **Duplicity** - Do the EEA appear in more than one functional area? Should the EEA appear in more than one functional area?
- **Applicability** - Are there EEA that may have been overcome by other decisions within the Army? Are the EEA still applicable to this study effort? Are there other EEA which should be added to the study?

The final list of EEAs is shown as issues and sub issues in the TRADOC study plan governing the study (see Appendix B). Appendix C also includes a list of significant events where the EEA were either directly or indirectly under scrutiny by the senior Army leadership.

#### ***1.7. ALTERNATIVES.***

To satisfy the intent of the Secretary of the Army's decision, three alternative designs for the integrated division were developed by TRADOC for analysis in this study. Key characteristics for each of the alternatives are described in Chapter 2. A diagram graphically depicting each alternative also accompanies the respective description.

## 1.8. METHODOLOGY.

### 1.8.1 Organized Approach.

To evaluate each alternative fairly on its own merits, an organized approach was required. Therefore, a draft study plan was developed identifying those elements deemed necessary to stand up the division. As the study plan was developed, it was recognized that the TRADOC Force Design Directorate (FDD), as the lead study agency, did not have the ability to independently complete the study. Several subjects of interest crossed boundaries into areas not within FDD's areas of familiarity or expertise. Issues such as stationing requirements, training requirements, resource determinations, and legal determinations required participation from other TRADOC agencies, FORSCOM agencies, and Department of the Army staff. Ultimately, roles and requirements for those agencies were clearly identified and written into the study plan. Finally, it was recognized that, given the amount of work required, the short time available to complete the study, and the relative shortage of government personnel available to do the work, a significant portion of the study workload could be diverted to appropriate government contractors possessing the needed expertise. This decision ultimately lead to contracts with PROSOFT, C<sup>2</sup>I, and CALIBRE corporations, and support from RAND Arroyo Center, a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC). A June 1996 Action Officer Workshop developed the details which led to the finalizing of the study plan which was ultimately approved by DCG, TRADOC on 6 August 1996 (See Appendix B).




Figure 1-2 Study Methodology

### *1.8.2 Combination of Approaches Used.*

A combination of approaches were used to evaluate each of three proposed alternatives and to answer the EEAs associated with each of the seven study areas (shown in Table 1-1). These approaches included a combination of interviews, literature searches, comparative analyses (to include development of such things as timelines, calendars, processes and requirements for each alternative) and identifying shortfalls across alternatives and against existing standards. The diagram below depicts the various steps of the methodology. Although the diagram implies that the steps were undertaken in a sequential manner, they were, in fact, researched concurrently and sequentially. Internal feedback loops are also present – but not shown – to ensure that results from one study area are incorporated into all other areas as appropriate and that the results from one study area were not adversely impacted by the findings in other areas.

### *1.8.3 Three Different Types of Analysis.*

Three different type of analyses were principally used to evaluate the seven functional areas - comparative analysis between alternatives/courses of action, literature searches, and interviews. In some cases, all three types were applied to a specific study area. In other cases, only one type of analysis was used for a study area. The table below displays the seven study areas and the types of analysis used for the respective area.

**Table 1-1 Analytic Techniques**

	<b>Doc</b>	<b>Org</b>	<b>Stat, Reg</b>	<b>Pre Mob Trng</b>	<b>Post Mob Trng</b>	<b>Force Implic</b>	<b>Resources</b>
<b>Comparative Analysis</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>
<b>Literature Searches</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	
<b>Interviews</b>				<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>		

The overall assessment of the three AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives used a combination of analyses across all seven functional areas and the “what might be” analysis of potential implementation considerations to arrive at a recommendation on the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept.

## **1.9. REPORT STRUCTURE.**

This final report documents the findings and observations from the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study and is divided into three volumes:

- Volume I is the Main Body of the report. It contains findings and observations for each functional area. There is also an Executive Summary. The executive summary presents the overall findings of the study without supporting details.
- Volume II is a classified volume. It contains the findings, observations, and supporting details for Force Implications.
- Volume III contains the Appendices that provide extensive data and analytical support for each functional area in the Main Body.

#### ***1.10. DISTRIBUTION.***

Distribution of Volumes I and III of this report is unlimited. An initial distribution to study participants was made. Copies are available from:

TRADOC Force Design Directorate  
ATTN: ATCD-F  
415 Sherman Avenue  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027  
Phone: 913-684-8674  
DSN: 552-8674.

Distribution of Volume II is limited to government agencies only. Copies must be requested from TRADOC Force Design Directorate.



## **Chapter Two DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVES**

### **2.1 OBJECTIVE.**

The objective is to develop a series of alternatives that satisfy the requirements of the Secretary of the Army decision of 23 May 1996 for AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions and can be evaluated to determine the viability of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept.

### **2.2 APPROACH.**

Initial efforts for developing AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives for evaluation fell into three broad areas:

- Determining what division-level designs best represent the range of options available;
- Determining what analysis could to be done to test the viability of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept; and
- Determining how to best conduct the analysis.

An in-house review by TRADOC of the three broad areas resulted in development of the three division designs that form the basis of this study spanning the range of possible command, control, and mobilization options. Each alternative would be fairly evaluated on its own merits against the criteria outline in the TRADOC Study Plan (see Appendix A).

### **2.3 ASSUMPTIONS.**

There are eight specific assumptions associated with this analysis. They are:

- The three organizational alternatives satisfy the intent of the Secretary of the Army for AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions.
- To the extent possible, all conceptual alternatives are in accordance with current Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE).
- The Enhanced Readiness Brigades (ERBs) retain current authorized level of organization (ALO), training, and equipment modernization levels.
- ERBs considered for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division are heavy variants.
- Material, personnel, and equipment are available to build the required division base units.

- AC Headquarters and Headquarters Companies (HHCs) in the AC/ARNG Integrated Division have the same ALO, training, and equipment modernization levels as their AC AOE division counterparts.
- AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions are split based with the ERBs located in different states; no restationing of units is required.
- Identification of the methodology to provide resources e.g., the bill payers, to implement specific alternatives exceeds the scope of the study and is within the purview of the HQDA, ODCSOPS.

## **2.4 DATA SOURCES.**

The sources of data and information for this analysis were:

- FM 25-100, *Training the Force*
- FM 25-1-1, *Battle Focused Training*
- FM 100-5, *Operations*
- FM 71-3, *The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade*
- FM 71-100, *Division Operations*
- FM 100-15, *Corps Operations*
- FM 100-17, *Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization*
- Brown, Roger Allen, Fedorochko, William Jr., and Schank, John F. *Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard*. Santa Monica: National Defense Research Institute. 1995.
- National Guard Bureau. Directorate of Force Management, Army National Guard. *Enhanced Brigade Handbook*. 1 Aug 95.

## **2.5 FINDINGS.**

Three proposed alternatives were developed to satisfy the intent of the Secretary of the Army. Each alternative can be fairly evaluated within the context of the Study Plan to determine the viability of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept.

### **2.5.1 Alternative 1.**

Alternative 1 (Figure 2-1) consists of an AC AOE division HHC, a division base and three assigned ERBs. The division base was decremented to the extent possible to avoid redundancies contained within the brigades. The brigades retain their ERB identity and do not reconfigure if the division is required to dispatch brigades only. However, if the division is assigned a division mission, the brigades must reconfigure to AOE designs immediately upon mobilization.




Figure 2-1 Alternative One

The mission(s) of Alternative 1 is:

- Conduct pre mobilization training to maintain properly trained and equipped units available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergency, or as otherwise directed.
- On order, the division mobilizes at home station, moves to mobilization station(s) as required, conducts post mobilization training, deploys to either air or sea ports of embarkation (APOE and/or SPOE) for commitment to conduct offensive and defensive operations. The division is prepared to conduct various stability and support operations as part of a corps, joint, or multi-national headquarters in overseas peacetime and conflict environments.
- On order, the division provides state(s), as directed by proper authority, trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies or as otherwise required by law e.g., Maintain public peace and order, disaster relief, etc.
- For the division HHC, continue to exercise command and control over non-deployed divisional units.

### 2.5.2 Alternative 2.

Alternative 2 (Figure 2-2) consists of an AC Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) HHC and three assigned ERBs. The division HHC does not

deploy with the ERBs and the ERBs retain their identity both pre and post mobilization.




Figure 2-2 Alternative Two

The mission(s) of Alternative 2 is:

- Conduct pre mobilization training to maintain properly trained and equipped units available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergency, or as otherwise directed.
- On order, mobilize at home stations, move to mobilization stations as required, and conduct post mobilization training. On order, ERBs deploy to APOE/SPOE for commitment to a corps, joint task force (JTF), or geographical CINCs to conduct offensive and defensive operations and various stability and support operations, semi-independently or as part of a corps, joint, or multi-national headquarters in overseas peacetime or conflict environments.
- On order, provide state(s), as directed by proper authority, trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies or as otherwise required by law (e.g., maintain public peace and order, disaster relief, etc.).
- For the division HHC, be prepared to accept and support the mobilization and training of other ERBs as determined by national command authority, e.g., to operate a warfighting center.

### 2.5.3 Alternative 3.

Alternative 3 (Figure 2-3) is an AOE division with an AC HHC. The assigned ERBs are reconfigured to task organized AOE designs. The division base is decremented to the extent necessary to provide the task organization required by the brigades for training purposes. There are no redundancies and the division does not reconfigure if mobilized to perform a divisional mission. The division can dispatch task organized brigades for brigade sized missions.




Figure 2-3 Alternative Three

The mission(s) of Alternative 3 is:

- Conduct pre mobilization training to maintain properly trained and equipped units available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergency, or as otherwise directed.
- On order, the division mobilizes at home stations, moves to mobilization station(s) as required, conducts post mobilization training, deploys to APOE/SPOE for commitment to conduct offensive and defensive operations. The division is prepared to conduct various stability and support operations as part of a corps, joint, or multi-national headquarters in overseas peacetime and conflict environments.
- On order, division provides state(s), as directed by appropriate authority, trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies or otherwise required by law e.g., maintain public peace and order, disaster relief, etc.
- For the division HHC, continue to exercise command and control over non-deployed divisional units.

## **2.6 OBSERVATIONS.**

- Alternative 1 may be required to reconfigure from ERBs into AOE organizations when the division is alerted for a divisional mission. At a minimum, reconfiguration results in movement of some personnel and requires administrative storage or some security measures for redundant equipment.
- In Alternative 2, the ERBs will always remain organized and equipped for sustained, semi-independent operations under corps control. They may be used to serve as a planning headquarters for contingency operations, to fight as a divisional brigade, to fight under corps command, or to serve as corps reserve. Employment as a division, however, is not possible under this alternative.
- In Alternative 3, the ERBs must reconfigure to task organized AOE divisional brigades immediately upon implantation, thus losing their identity as ERBs and a Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) resource. Peacetime, pre mobilization stationing will also probably be in a task organized manner.
- All three alternatives retain the ability to perform state missions under specified authority. (See Chapter 5)
- The task list for wartime operations, stability and support operations, and state operations can be found at Appendix D.

## Chapter Three DOCTRINE

### 3.1 OBJECTIVE.

The objective is to identify any differences in doctrinal requirements for the proposed command and control relationships and the employment of the divisions and/or enhanced brigades in a combat role for the three AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives.

### 3.2 APPROACH.

The doctrinal analysis compared the proposed requirements for each of the three AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives against existing applicable Army doctrinal field manuals (FM). The doctrinal publications used to conduct a comparative analysis for each alternative are the Army's keystone warfighting manual (FM 100-5) and corps, division, and brigades doctrinal manuals. These publications provide the fundamental principles for warfighting doctrine and are applicable when the respective organizations are deployed into a theater of operations.

### 3.3 ASSUMPTIONS.

There is only one assumption in this analysis: The proposed AC/ARNG Integrated Division organizational alternatives remain as defined in Chapter 2.

### 3.4 DATA SOURCES.

- JCS Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
- FM 71-3, *The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade*, 8 January 1996.
- FM 71-100, *Division Operations*, 28 August 1996.
- FM 71-100-1, *Armor and Mechanized Division Operations, Tactics, and Techniques* (Coordinating Draft), May 1991.
- FM 71-100-2, *Infantry Division Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, 31 August 1993.
- FM 71-100-3, *Air Assault Division Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, June 1996.
- FM 100-5, *Operations*, June 1993.
- FM 100-15, *Corps Operations*, 29 October 1996.

- FM 100-17, *Mobilization. Deployment. Redeployment. Demobilization.* 28 October 1992.
- FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Graphics.* 1994.

### **3.5 FINDINGS.**

#### *3.5.1 Platform for discussion of findings.*

FM 101-5-1 and JCS Pub. 1-02 define doctrine as fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. Doctrine is authoritative, but it requires judgment in application. Doctrinal principles are not theory; rather, they represent the cumulative experience and collective wisdom of the Army. In other words, doctrinal principles are those principles proven to work best for carrying out military operations.

Army doctrine, as a whole, is embodied in various levels of doctrinal publications. These levels of doctrinal publications begin with the fundamental principles and proceed to more detailed guidance at each succeeding level. This detailed guidance is comprised of three categories: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP).

- Tactics apply to employment of units in combat and the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or the enemy.
- Techniques are the methods used by troops and/or commanders to perform assigned missions and functions.
- Procedures provide standard and detailed courses of action that describe how to perform a task.

In addition to TTP, doctrinal principles apply to military forces (operating) in support of national objectives and are used to guide actions.

#### *3.5.2 Doctrinal Analysis.*

- FM 100-5, *Operations.* FM 100-5 is the Army's keystone warfighting doctrine. It describes how to think about the conduct of campaigns, major operations, battles, engagements, and operations other than war. It applies to the Total Army, active and reserve component as well as Army civilians. Finally, FM 100-5 furnishes the authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrine (levels of doctrinal publications), force design, materiel acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training.

- FM 100-15, *Corps Operations*. A corps normally has two to five divisions of any type and combination. Divisions perform major corps tactical operations and are the basic maneuver units at the tactical level. Divisions can perform any tactical mission and are largely self-sustaining. Occasionally, divisions function as operational-level headquarters, but can conduct sustained battles and engagements and operations other than war (OOTW). Separate maneuver brigades help reinforce maneuver divisions but are capable of operations as independent units. Separate brigades, however, are not capable of sustained operations unless augmented.
- FM 71-100, *Division Operations*. The division is the largest Army organization that trains and fights as a tactical team. Largely self sustaining, the division is capable of independent operations. It is a unit of maneuver, organized with a varying number and types of combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) units. Divisions are classified as armored, mechanized, medium, light infantry, airborne, or air assault; however, all division types are generally organized with a similar basic design. This design comprises a division HHC, three ground maneuver brigades, an aviation brigade, a division artillery, a support command, a cavalry squadron, an air defense artillery battalion, an engineer brigade (or battalion), a signal battalion, a military police company and, in most cases, a chemical company.

The division HHC provides command and control for the division's organic, attached, or supporting units. The maneuver brigade headquarters provides the command and control (C2) facilities for units assigned or attached to the brigade. The only unit permanently assigned to the brigade is the brigade HHC. The necessary combat, CS, and CSS units to accomplish the brigade mission are attached, under operational control (OPCON), or placed in support of the brigade.

Fighting and winning battles and engagements remain the division's primary purpose. FM 71-100 also discusses the fundamentals of force projections and the division's requirements to mobilize, deploy and operate anywhere in the world for war or OOTW. FMs 71-100-1, 71-100-2, and 71-100-3 expand on the fundamentals of division operations and contain the detailed TTP for their respective type divisions.

- FM 71-3, *The Armored and Mechanized Brigade*. Armored and mechanized brigades are organized to successfully fight engagements in conventional operations and various OOTW activities. Armored and mechanized brigades are subordinate commands of a division, corps, or joint task force (JTF) headquarters and perform major tactical operations as part of a division or corps operations.

Separate brigades, on the other hand, normally conduct operations under corps command and are organized to provide their own support. A separate brigade may be attached to a division (less support), but is usually controlled by a corps. The enhanced brigades of the Army National Guard are separate brigades.

A comparative analysis of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives against the doctrinal publications described above is shown in the following table. A “Supported” entry for an alternative implies that the FM supports the respective alternative. FM 71-100, *Division Operations*, does not apply to Alternative 2 because the division command and control element above the enhanced brigade is a Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) organization.

**Table 3-1 Comparison of Alternatives to Doctrine**

<b>Army FM</b>	<b>Alternative 1</b>	<b>Alternative 2</b>	<b>Alternative 3</b>
71-3	Supported	Supported	Supported
71-100	Supported	N/A	Supported
100-5	Supported	Supported	Supported
100-15	Supported	Supported	Supported

### **3.6 OBSERVATIONS.**

- All three AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives can be supported with currently approved doctrine.
- No changes/modifications are required to current doctrine for the AC/RC Integrated Division alternatives.
- Warfighting doctrine does not apply to TDA organizations e.g., the division HHC for Alternative 2.

## **Chapter Four ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS**

### **4.1 OBJECTIVE.**

The objective is to identify which existing TOE organizational designs could be utilized to form the three alternative designs for the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions; to identify those cases where new organizational designs are required; and to examine each alternative division design in light of its ultimate stated mission.

### **4.2 APPROACH.**

As indicated in Chapter 1, the overarching study guidance directed the development and evaluation of alternative designs that could serve as the basis for two integrated divisions. Each integrated division would consist of an AC division HHC — not to exceed 250-300 personnel — plus three ARNG enhanced readiness brigades. To ensure all possible methods of peacetime training, mobilization, and wartime employment would be addressed, three alternative designs were developed based on current Department of the Army (DA) approved Army of Excellence (AOE) Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) when possible. Each alternative division design was ultimately subjectively evaluated by subject matter experts to determine its overall ability to accomplish respective missions as well as its overall suitability and acceptability.

### **4.3 ASSUMPTIONS.**

The following assumptions were critical to the organizational analysis for the three AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives:

- AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions are AOE heavy divisions.
- AC contribution to the proposed design is 250-300 person HHC.
- All units, including the ARNG ERBs, are organized in accordance with objective TOEs.
- ERBs retain their current authorized level of organization (ALO), training, and equipment modernization levels.

DA approved TOEs served as the basis for each alternative design. Appendix E shows the standard requirement codes (SRCs) applicable to each alternative design.

#### 4.5.1 Alternative 1.



The figure above is a graphic portrayal of Alternative 1. A full page version of this, as well as the other two alternatives, is at Appendix D. Alternative 1 is the most complicated alternative. It consists of an AC division HHC responsible for coordination and supervision of training activities of three assigned ERBs during peacetime. Alternative 1 also has a standard division base. As mentioned earlier, this division base has been decremented to the extent possible to account for redundancies contained within the assigned ERBs. In some cases, however, redundancies exist as certain elements of the division base are required for

training purposes. Appendix E graphically displays all decrements and redundancies for this alternative.

The Alternative 1 division or division assets may be employed in one of two ways:

- For some missions, the Alternative 1 division may be required to provide combat ready separate brigades without deploying the division HHC or division base units; or
- The division as a whole may be deployed. In this case, the ERBs and division base units are reconfigured into AOE division designs when mobilized and before post mobilization training commences.

The Alternative 1 organization has the advantage of preserving ERBs for separate missions and for peacetime command and control. However, it is more difficult to deploy as a division due to the need to reconfigure at time of mobilization and the need to administratively store redundant equipment.

#### 4.5.2 Alternative 2.




Figure 4-2 Alternative Two


Alternative 2, shown above, is the most simple alternative. It consists of an AC table of distribution and allowances (TDA) division HHC responsible for coordination and training activities of three assigned ERBs during peacetime,

mobilization, and post mobilization to the point in time when the brigades deploy to a point of embarkation (either an APOE or and SPOE) for commitment to their stated wartime/OOTW missions. The division TDA HHC never deploys, but remains available to conduct training of follow-on forces. As a result, the division HHC has a non-standard (non-TOE) configuration to account for mission requirements.

Alternative 2 has the advantage of preserving the ERBs for separate missions and peacetime training. However, it has the disadvantage of never being able to be employed as a division, thus losing the synergism built over a period of time.

### 4.5.3 Alternative 3.

Alternative 3 (Figure 4-3 below) consists of an AOE division design with an AC division HHC. The division is responsible for coordination and supervision of training activities during peacetime, mobilization, and after mobilization. When committed, the Alternative 3 division functions as a standard AOE division.



### Figure 4-3 Alternative Three

Under some circumstances, the division may not be required to totally deploy, but provide task organized brigades as required.

This division has the advantages of always training with habitually associated organizations, already being in a division configuration when mobilized for

division missions, and not having redundancies in personnel or equipment. Its disadvantages are the loss of separate brigade structure to the respective state National Guard structures and the loss of six ERBs from the 15 identified in the base force established in the Bottom Up Review.

**Table 4-1 Comparison of Alternatives to Organization Designs**

All three alternatives can be supported by existing TOE organizations. Alternative 2 requires development of a mission specific TDA division HHC.
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#### **4.6 OBSERVATIONS.**

Several observations are made from the organization analysis:

- Approved TOE designs are applicable to Alternative 1. The total personnel requirement and the equipment density are the highest of the three alternatives due to unavoidable redundancies within the brigade and division base organizations that are required for peacetime existence.
- Approved TOE designs are applicable to the Alternative 2 ERBs only. The AOE division HHC TOE is not appropriate for the mission because there is a significant misalignment of functions. The training-only mission for the division HHC requires replacement of the AOE division HHC.
- Approved TOE designs are applicable to Alternative 3. Stationing will most likely occur by locating a task organized brigade within a geographic area; hence the division base will appear decremented. The personnel savings achieved by this alternative when compared to Alternative 1 result from the brigades converting to AOE designs during peacetime, rather than retaining the ERB design.
- Significant force structure must be generated to establish the division base for either Alternatives 1 or 3.



## **Chapter Five STATUTORY, REGULATORY, ADMINISTRATION & DATA FLOW**

### ***SECTION 1 – STATUTORY AND REGULATORY***

#### ***5.1 OBJECTIVE.***

The objective is to identify potential conflicts in statutes, regulations, administration and data flow and to identify authorities which can be delegated AC/ARNG Integrated Division Commanders.

#### ***5.2 APPROACH.***

On 27 January 1997, the Study Director for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept study met with representatives from the Headquarters, Department of the Army Office of the Judge Advocate General to review the legal issues surrounding the concept for a combined AC/ARNG Integrated Division. The review included general comments concerning the overall concept and addressed specific requested areas. The general areas of discussion were:

- Command of AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions,
- Use of Army National Guard units,
- Inherent authority of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Commander,
- Memorandum of agreement (MOA) and its coordination, and
- *Posse Comitatus*.

Specific areas addressed were:

- Association of ARNG brigades and divisions with AC units,
- Unit vacancy officer promotions,
- Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority,
- Funding for AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions,
- Full time manning,
- School seats,
- Combat training center (CTC) rotations, and
- Training policy.

### **5.3 ASSUMPTIONS.**

There is only one assumption used in this analysis: the division structure is designed to maximize the authority of the active duty (AD) commander, duplicating the authority of a full AD division commander.

### **5.4 DATA SOURCES.**

Applicable portions of the United States Code, public laws, and the UCMJ were used to assemble the finding for regulatory and statutory conflicts.

### **5.5 FINDINGS.**

#### **5.5.1 General Comments.**

The authority of the AD commander is maximized immediately if and when the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions are activated for a Federal mission. The AD commander's authority would be complete in the mobilization, deployment, and post deployment phases. The following issues must be addressed/resolved to maximize the AD commander's authority during normal peacetime training operations.

**Command.** Authority may be delegated to the commander of an integrated National Guard/Active Army Division that will enable him to more effectively exercise command of the division and ensure it is properly trained to perform its wartime mission. This authority comes from statutes that prescribe authority and duties of the Federal authorities (the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army and the appropriate combatant commander) and from the governor of the state in charge of the Army National Guard units making up the National Guard portion of the Integrated Division. If the commander is a Regular Army officer, the officer may hold a state appointment under the provision of (UP) 32 U.S.C. 315, thus placing the commander in the state chain of command as well as the Federal chain of command.

**Use of National Guard Units.** The National Guard, by definition, has a dual Federal and state status. If the commander of an integrated division operates solely under Federal authority, the commander does not have command of the ARNG brigades while they are performing state active duty missions or are otherwise not in a Title 10 status. If the commander operates with combined Federal and state authority (e.g., the commander accepts a state commission), he has command of subordinate units but is also subject to two sovereign superior

authorities (Federal authorities and the state governor). This creates a potential conflict that is aggravated if two or three state commissions are required (e.g., the units making up the integrated division come from more than one state.). Additionally, note that although 10 U.S.C. 12314 provides that a Reserve officer may be detailed or assigned to any duty authorized by law for members of the Regular Army, if the commander is not a Regular Army officer, there is no authority for such an officer to also accept a state commission as permitted by 32 U.S.C. 315.

**Inherent Authority of the Commander.** The inherent authority of the commander is a legal doctrine recognized by the courts. Generally, it provides commanders with appropriate authority to accomplish all responsibilities, to include good order and discipline. This authority is supplemented by specific grants or delegations. As the duties and responsibilities of the AD commander are agreed to by the Secretary of the Army and the respective state adjutant generals (TAGs), an appropriate delegation of authority should be included to maximize the authority of the AD commander.

**Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).** Because of the potential for conflict between the integrated division commander's responsibility to the governor(s) and Federal authorities, specific areas where conflicts may be expected to arise should be addressed in a MOA between Federal and state authorities. Such areas include, but are not limited to, scheduling of training and performance of state missions, the commander's authority to relieve or suspend from command subordinate commanders in the division, and the commander's ability to allocate training funds. The statutory authorities described below provide a basis for delegating authority to the AC/ARNG Integrated Division commander in numerous areas.

- 32 U.S.C. 104(d) provides that Regular Army commissioned officers may be detailed to command National Guard units.
- 32 U.S.C. 105 provides that the Secretary of the Army shall have inspections made by inspectors general or other commissioned officer of the Regular Army of Army National Guard property, organization, members, training, records, accounts, and readiness for deployability. The Secretary of the Army could require the inspecting officers to report directly to the AC/ARNG Integrated Division commander and permit the commander to schedule the required inspections.
- 32 U.S.C. 108 prescribes that the President may bar the National Guard of a state from receiving money or other aid, or benefit, if the state fails to comply with a requirement of title 32. The President could require the AC/ARNG Integrated Division commander to certify the states' compliance with these requirements before payment to the state is made.
- The AC/ARNG Integrated Division commander can also be given a certification roll in the Federal recognition process for ARNG officers

assigned to the integrated division, UP 32 U.S.C. Ch 3, and Title XI of the NDAA for FY 1993, as amended (PL 102-484). Additionally, the Chief, NGB can delegate the organization's role as a channel of communications between the National Guard and the Secretary of the Army to the AC/ARNG Integrated Division commander.

- 32 U.S.C. 708 prescribes the responsibilities of United States Property and Fiscal Officers. These officers can be directed to report the AC/ARNG Integrated Division commander's resource management office.
- 10 U.S.C. 164 and the 6 September 1996 Secretary of Defense memorandum defines CINC responsibilities. The Atlantic Command (ACOM) commander could delegate some of his authority to the commander.

**Posse Comitatus.** Although a Regular Army officer may hold a state commission, the *Posse Comitatus* Act (18 U.S.C. 1385) prohibits that officer's participation in the enforcement of civil laws unless otherwise permitted by law, despite the holding of a state appointment (see *US v. Brown*, 206 U.S. 240 (1907)).

**Coordination.** A redistribution of authorities over the ARNG units would potentially affect other Federal and state organizations. The memorandum of agreement should be fully coordinated; at a minimum, coordination with the appropriate combatant commander and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is recommended. Two example MOAs, uncoordinated, are shown in Appendix J.

#### 5.5.2 Specific Comments.

**Association of ARNG Units.** Title XI, Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (ANGCRRRA), Section 1131 requires every ARNG combat arms unit to be associated with an active component combat unit, brigade or higher. Associating an AC/ARNG Integrated Division with an active duty Corps, making the Corps commander responsible for the requirements in Section 1131(b), meets this statutory mandate.

- **Unit Vacancy Officer Promotions.** Title XI, ANGCRRRA, Section 1113 requires the AC commander of the associated unit or another AC officer designated by the Secretary of the Army to review unit vacancy officer promotions in the reserve combat unit. This can be the Corps commander, or the AC/ARNG Integrated Division commander, or an AC staff officer (G-1) if designated by the Secretary of the Army.
- **Deployability Standards.** 32 U.S.C. 105, Section 105 (a)(7) requires a Regular Army officer to determine whether or not the Army National Guard

unit meets deployability standards, requirements for deployment, and prescribed physical and other qualifications. This can be done by the AC/ARNG Integrated Division commander or an AC staff officer.

- **UCMJ Authority.** To maintain appropriate discipline, an AD commander who also held a state commission can exercise both state and Federal UCMJ authority.
- **Funding.** Funding for an AC/ARNG Integrated Division would potentially come from a number of Federal and state appropriations. Once the sources of the funding are identified, the purposes and uses must be established. To avoid violations of the Purpose Statute (31 U.S.C. 1301), the initial opinion is that amendments to both Federal and state statutes would be required to allow the AD commander to commingle funds.
- **Full Time Manning.** Manning is a force structure issue that may be determined by the Secretary of the Army and TAG's in a MOA.
- **School Seats.** Training quotas are determined as a matter of policy; there are no legal issues that need to be addressed.
- **CTC Rotation.** CTC rotation is a training issue with no legal ramifications; however, the priority of state missions over scheduled training must be addressed in the MOA.
- **Relief for Cause.** Relief for cause is an exercise of command authority. An MOA between the Secretary of the Army and the TAG's could outline appropriate responsibilities and authorities. Legally, the procedures employed must meet both Army and the respective state due process requirements.
- **Training Policy.** This is primarily a policy issue to be resolved in the MOA. The overall training program must address any unique state mission training requirements of the ARNG.

Table 5-1 Legal Analysis

<p>The overall concept for an AC/ARNG Integrated Division is not legally objectionable; however, the implementation of the concept will require a close review of fiscal and personnel issues as they relate to specific actions to ensure that there are no statutory or regulatory violations.</p>
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## **5.6 OBSERVATIONS.**

Once the final memorandum of agreement for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division has been approved and specific ERBs identified, a more detailed review of the final memorandum of agreement is required by the OTJAG.

## **SECTION 2 – COMMAND AND CONTROL ISSUES**

### **5.7 NATURE OF THE PROBLEM FOR THE COMMANDER.**

The unprecedented nature of a fully integrated AC-ARNG division brings to the fore a series of new issues. The solution to these issues requires careful analysis, consideration and innovation. The most basic of these issues – and therefore the most critical – is command and control (C2). Put simply, in the context of an integrated division, is command divisible or indivisible? This is not a rhetorical question. It cuts to the heart of a fundamental difference in the way AC and ARNG divisions operate under routine conditions.

For the ARNG, the constant is the peacetime command exercised over units by the governors of the states. Division commanders whose units cross state boundaries (e.g., the commander of the 35<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division) do not – and cannot – exercise command in its fullest and purest sense in peacetime. Division-level activities are carried out on the basis of procedures arranged by consensus among the affected commands and states. The nature of the organizations, and the statutory and regulatory constraints under which they operate, make this process inescapable.

AC divisions, on the other hand, are bound by different constraints centered around the absolute need to be mission capable and ready for expeditious deployment to a theater of war. The division commander exercises command - his authority is fully consistent with his responsibilities.

The commanders of the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions, however, will find themselves confronted with elements of both contexts described above. At a minimum, the AC/ARNG Integrated Division MSCs will be located in geographically dispersed locations, and will — by law — be under the command of the respective state governors. Nevertheless, as division commanders, they cannot exercise their responsibilities without an equivalent level of authority over the division elements which have designated wartime missions and concomitantly high placement on the priority of force generation.

The issue, therefore, lies in determining the means to reconcile the contradiction between the AC and ARNG modes of operation. The division commander must


be vested with the authority necessary to carry out his responsibilities, while the integrity of the pertinent federal statutes is maintained. Specific topics to be addressed include (but are not limited to) the authority to:

- Approve training programs and plans, and promulgate training guidance;
- Review, validate and forward unit readiness reports;
- Direct the apportionment of operations and maintenance resources;
- Select the commanders of subordinate elements;
- Exercise state and federal UCMJ authority;
- Supervise and manage the full-time support personnel in units assigned to the divisions;
- Rate and/or review the commanders of subordinate elements; and,
- Apply standard operating procedures throughout the division (and therefore, across state boundaries).

Institutionalizing this authority and the appropriate regulations is critical to the success of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept.

### ***5.8 INFUSING THE AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISIONS.***

The commander of an AC division contends with two Federal chains of command - one flows from the Secretary of Defense through the Secretary of the Army to the unit; the second chain of command flows from the Secretary of Defense through the CINC to the unit. The commander of an AC/ARNG Integrated Division has three chains of command - the two Federal chains of command and a state chain of command. The state chain of command flows through the respective state governors and state adjutant generals to the units. The challenge is determining the correct manner for infusing the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions to ensure the division commander is given the requisite authority, responsibility and accountability to accomplish assigned missions and to ensure the success of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept. Figure 5-1 shows the current command climate for infusing the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions.



**Figure 5-1 The Current C2 Climate**

The issue of command and control must be addressed and resolved early in the implementation planning process. The AC/ARNG Integrated Division commander must be fully vested with the requisite authority, responsibility, and accountability to ensure the success of the division and the concept. Chapter 10 and Appendix J outline two methods that can be used to accomplish these purposes and the mechanism that can be used to define the duties and responsibilities for the respective participants.

### ***SECTION 3 – COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTERS (C4) SYSTEMS INCOMPATIBILITIES***

#### ***5.9 OBJECTIVE.***

The objective is to provide the background for, and illustrative examples of, incompatibility and inaccessibility issues which exist between and among critical command, control, communications and computers (C4) systems of the AC and the ARNG. The purpose is to raise an issue which, because of its seriousness, could severely hamper the operations of the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions and will require a thorough examination and corrective action.

### **5.10 BACKGROUND.**

The development of information management systems dates back to the early 1960s, when automation was seen primarily as a means of increasing the performance efficiency for discrete tasks. As a result, specific systems, residing on their own platforms and utilizing distinct coding protocols, were developed to meet specific, functionally-oriented requirements. In this context, data transfer was seen largely as a vertical phenomenon; little or no provisions were made for laterally sharing information. Thus, these systems (commonly referred to as “stovepipe” systems) were unable to perform associated tasks, and their information was not readily available or accessible outside the system.

Over time, some of these systems were broadened to allow applications that perform multiple, but related, functions. The development of these applications, however, tended to occur in isolation from other systems and vertical communication tended to be emphasized over lateral communications. To compound the problem, the differences in requirements between the active and reserve components led to the development of component-specific systems. The end result was entire layers of mutually inaccessible databases and overlapping functional systems.

With the development of large, all-encompassing networks, the inability of stovepipe systems to communicate with one another has become an increasingly large obstacle to genuine data sharing. The goal of a common operating environment, adopted by DoD and the Services, makes the retention of older, legacy systems increasingly problematic. In the tactical environment, the movement toward the electronic battlefield and the increasing emphasis being given to information warfare means that operating units must be able to share electronic information vertically and laterally.

### **5.11 APPROACH.**

The approach to identifying C4 + Intelligence (C4I) system incompatibilities was done in three steps: describe the problem, discuss its origins, and provide illustrative examples which portray the depth of the overall problem.

For purposes of clarity, the term *system* describes a device, or series of devices, which fill specific communications and/or automation purposes. A system consists of *hardware*, the mechanism, and *software*, the coded instructions which actuate the hardware. *Incompatible* refers to two or more discrete systems which cannot share information because of an inability to connect or communicate, while the term *inaccessible* refers to data which, because it is stored in a system which is not compatible with other systems, cannot be retrieved or utilized by other persons operating other systems.

### **5.12 ASSUMPTIONS.**

- Each AC/ARNG Integrated Division is required to train (pre mobilization) and operate (post mobilization and employment) as a coherent whole; thus requiring the division HHC and its constituent units to communicate and share data both vertically and laterally.
- The objective C4I system, as established by pertinent DoD, Army and FORSCOM policy statements, defines the desired C4I end state and provides the baseline against which the C4I systems of the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions are judged.

### **5.13 DATA SOURCES.**

- Joint Chiefs of Staff, *C4I for the Warrior*, 1994.
- Department of the Army, *The Army Enterprise Strategy*, 1993.
- Department of the Army, *The Army Technical Architecture*, 1995.
- Forces Command, *The FORSCOM Objective C4I System*, 1995.
- Field Manuals:
  - 11-32, *Combat Net Radio Operations*
  - 11-41, *Signal Support: Echelons Corps and Below*
  - 11-50, *Combat Communications within the Division (Heavy)*
  - 100-5, *Operations* (Chapter 3, *Force Projection*)
  - 100-6, *Information Operations*
- Interviews with Information Systems Managers:
  - Headquarters, Forces Command
  - National Guard Bureau
  - The Army Signal Center and School
  - Georgia STARC
  - 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized)

### **5.14 FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS.**

#### **5.14.1 Background.**

The scope of the problem is all-encompassing; it affects both tactical and sustaining base systems, operating both vertically and laterally. The problem will also persist regardless of which, if any, AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternative is selected. The problem is not unique to the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept.

In the case of tactical systems, problems arise from incompatible or nonexistent systems. Specifically, older tactical communications systems remain in the inventory of some ERBs. Army-standard automation systems have not been fielded to the ERBs because their fielding priorities are not currently sufficiently high enough to warrant earlier modernization. Thus, the problem is addressable largely through a review and adjustment of existing fielding priorities.

For sustaining base systems, however, the problem runs even deeper. In general, there are three categories of incompatibilities which may apply singularly or in tandem to particular systems. These categories are:

- *Requirements* – systems derived from different operating specifications, derived, in turn, from different operating requirements;
- *Hardware and/or software* – systems designed to serve similar purposes, but designed around different platforms; and,
- *Data transfer/conversion* – systems which are compatible only in the sense that data transfer between or among them must take place in egregiously inefficient manners.

#### 5.14.2 Tactical Systems.

The ability to conduct modern battlefield operations is dependent upon the ability to communicate and share electronic data. Increasingly, systems are appearing in the inventory which are designed to maximize the unit's ability to carry out these functions. However, the pace of modernization in the ERBs does not match their collective placement in the priority of force generation.

Two examples illustrate the depth of this problem -- the *Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)* and the *Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS)*.

#### *SINCGARS*

SINCGARS replaces the VRC-12 family of radios, and constitutes the primary — and therefore objective — voice communications means for the warfighter. SINCGARS is based on a modular design which allows maximum commonality while retaining sufficient flexibility to fit a wide range of ground and airborne configurations.

The fielding of SINCGARS has moved fast, with primary emphasis being accorded to AC and Force Support Package (FSP) units. By the end of CY 97 however, only seven of the 15 ERBs will have SINCGARS. Of the remaining

eight, not all have been programmed for SINCGARS fielding. Thus, it is possible, perhaps even likely, that the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions will not be completely outfitted with SINCGARS prior to their activation, which means that their ability to communicate vertically and laterally, both internally and externally, will be severely hampered.

The solution to this potential problem requires the redesign of fielding priorities for SINCGARS. Such action, however, is dependent upon early identification of the pertinent requirements and expeditious coordination with the appropriate force modernization agencies and program managers.

### *ATCCS*

ATCCS is the Army's primary system (deriving from the Army Battle Command System [ABCS]) for automating command and control from corps to battalion levels. ATCCS is made up of several interlocking subsystems which automate the maneuver control, intelligence, artillery, air defense and combat service support battlefield operating systems (BOS). Each of these systems is pertinent to brigades, either as a contributors or end user. Furthermore, these are the primary automated systems for corps and division level command and control. Thus, the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions will require fully-outfitted and functioning ATCCS suites to operate effectively.

At present, fielding of ATCCS subsystems is in its early stages; however, none of the ERBs are scheduled for fielding of the pertinent ATCCS subsystems, and thus they, and the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions, upon implementation, will be unable to utilize the functionality provided by ATCCS.

Again, the solution to the problem lies in reconfiguration of fielding priorities.

#### *5.14.3 Sustaining Base Systems.*

As discussed above, the problems with sustaining base systems can be categorized in three distinct, though often overlapping, ways:

### *DISTINCT REQUIREMENTS*

The existence of distinct operating requirements within functional areas, but among components, led to the development of different systems which remain incompatible. An example of this problem is the *Standard Installation/Division Personnel System* (SIDPERS).

*SIDPERS*, in its various manifestations, grew out of the need to automate personnel functions to make the peacetime processes of personnel management more efficient, and to allow a more effective means of transitioning a unit from a peacetime to a wartime footing (including the accession of mobilized or federalized unit personnel to AC status).

However, differing AC and RC unit peacetime personnel management functions (for example, the ARNG's need to track drill attendance, a function not pertinent to AC units) led to the creation of different systems and maintaining databases with different data elements and fields. As a result, distinct versions of *SIDPERS* were developed for the AC and the RC without functioning interconnectivity. At present, data is not directly transferable between *SIDPERS*-AC and *SIDPERS*-ARNG. While this problem has been recognized for some time, and was highlighted during Operation DESERT SHIELD, a replacement system (designated as *SIDPERS*-III) is not yet fielded.

#### *DIFFERENT SYSTEMS.*

The development of different systems, in isolation from similar developments elsewhere, was a feature of early computer evolution. As a result, the transfer of data among separate systems can require inordinate degrees of manipulation and is often impossible. An example of this problem is the *Reserve Component Automation System* (RCAS).

RCAS was initiated to integrate the automation of administration, mobilization and deployment and day-to-day operations for the RC. The fielding plan envisioned providing USAR and ARNG organizations with a complete "turnkey" system of hardware, communications, office automation software, and ten blocks of functional area applications (e.g., Military Pay, Schools Administration, Property Accountability and Food Service). However, RCAS was developed in isolation of other systems and requirements and its reliance on proprietary (as opposed to commercial-off-the-shelf [COTS]) software means it lacks transparency to other users, broad functionality, and appropriate interface with other Army and DoD systems. As a result, RCAS fielding was halted pending a complete restructuring of the program to address these deficiencies.

#### *INEFFICIENT DATA TRANSFER/MANIPULATION.*

Army functional systems -- including those which cross, or should cross, component lines -- must be able to accept automatic transfer of data in formats which can be easily retrieved and manipulated. However, this requirement too often goes unmet because of the "stovepipe" process of development. The

emergence of the common operating environment as a governing concept for all Army and DoD automation further militates against isolated systems.

At present, too many systems require the physical transfer and/or manipulation of data prior to its being accessible by other systems. Examples of this problem include:

- SIDPERS
- Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS)
- Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS)
- Transportation Coordinator - Automated Command and Control System (TC ACCIS)

In each of these cases, the problems of incompatibility and inaccessibility are recognized and retrofitting projects of varying types are underway. In some cases, these retrofits will resolve the existing problems (e.g., SARSS-Objective); in other cases, it will not resolve all of them (e.g., TC AIMS, the successor to TC ACCIS).

**Table 5- 1 Systems Analysis**

All three alternatives suffer to a similar degree from the systemic problems outlined in this section. At this time, there is no attempt to categorize any of the alternatives as better or worse than others in this area. Major systems enhancements in order to provide the Division commander with a systemic view of the Battlefield Operating Systems within the Division are required.
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### **5.15 CONCLUSIONS.**

The continued existence of multiple systems which are mutually incompatible, and whose data is large inaccessible, constitutes a serious problem for the Army as a whole; they present what could be enormous obstacles to the successful operation of AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions.

These problems:

- Reduce soldier proficiency and hamper unit effectiveness;
- Detract from the appearance, in addition to the reality, of a functioning Total Army; and,
- Defeat the purpose of the common operating environment standard.

To successfully accomplish its missions, a unit must be able to move, shoot and *communicate*. The last quality increasingly means the ability to transfer time-sensitive data as well as voice communication. Consequently, any systemic difficulty detracting from this ability has a deleterious influence on mission

accomplishment, and detracts from the capacity of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division to function *as* a division, in peace or in war.

This set of problems must, therefore, be addressed in any implementation plan preceding the activation of AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions. Specifically the plan must:

- Provide a thorough inventory of affected system(s);
- Identify systems requiring replacement through modernization, and those qualifying for retrofit under existing programs;
- Identify problems for which there is as yet no army-wide response; and,
- Recommend interim measures to soften the impact in the initial stages of AC/ARNG Integrated Division activation.



## **Chapter Six PRE MOBILIZATION TRAINING**

### **6.1 OBJECTIVE.**

The objective is to identify pre mobilization training requirements for the division HHC and division base units associated for each AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternative to ensure it is provided battle focused training that supports its capability to ATTACK, DEFEND, and/or MOVEMENT TO CONTACT.

### **6.2 APPROACH.**

The four step process used to identify training requirements is described in the following paragraphs.

The first step assesses the pre mobilization training impacts on the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept by posing the following questions:

- Will the existing pre mobilization training proficiency floors, established by Section 1119, Title XI, remain the same if the unit is assigned to an integrated division?
- Given the limited training time available, will the ARNG units be exempted from state missions? If not, how much additional training and time will be needed?
- What changes/modifications to current training documents are required for each AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternative?
- Who is responsible for training AC/ARNG Integrated Division units?
- What are the key training opportunities outside the CTC experience for the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions?
- What are the leader development requirements?

The second step uses a systematic analysis focusing on linking pre mobilization training to the required missions for an Integrated Division: ATTACK, DEFEND, and MOVEMENT TO CONTACT.

The third step develops a pre mobilization training strategy.

The fourth step links the pre mobilization training strategy to its related post mobilization requirements.

Within the framework of this approach, four specific issues were analyzed:

- Collective training tasks for the division HHC and division base units within each alternative (See Tab 1 to Appendix F).
- Unique pre mobilization training tasks required for each alternative (See Tab 2 to Appendix F).
- Training products and responsibilities (See Tab 3 to Appendix F).
- Unique leader development requirements (See Tab 4 to Appendix F).

### **6.3 ASSUMPTIONS.**

- The roles envisioned for ERBs, as outlined in the Army Staff's Enhanced Brigade Study, apply to AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions.
- The higher priority accorded ERBs, regarding resources and certain authorized overstructures, apply in full to any units activated under this concept.
- That portion of the AC support system which focuses its efforts on the ERBs, specifically including the pertinent Ground Force Readiness Enhancement (GFRE) units, are available in full to the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions.
- FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 remains the base authoritarian source for both pre and post mobilization training of the Reserve Component forces. The emphasis of pre mobilization training remains focused on platoon and company levels. Units train to be able to sustain operations at the level organized.
- The gaining WARTRACE overseas CINC approves the AC/ARNG Integrated Division's Mission Essential Task List (METL).
- Distance learning facilities provide the capability for simulation based training for command and staff exercises, and for functional training for soldiers and leaders.

#### **6.4 DATA SOURCES.**

The sources used to collect the data contained in this chapter are identified in Tab 5 to Appendix H.

#### **6.5 FINDINGS.**

##### **6.5.1 Training Goals.**

Title XI effectively provides the current statutory baseline regarding the combat readiness and utilization of the ARNG. Section 1119 establishes the pre mobilization training goals:

“The Secretary of the Army shall establish a program to minimize the post mobilization training time required for combat units of the Army National Guard. The Program shall require:

That unit pre mobilization training emphasize :

- individual soldier qualification and training;
- collective training and qualification at the crew, section, team, and squad level; and ,
- maneuver training at the platoon level as required of all Army units;

That combat training for command and staff leadership include annual multi-echelon training to develop battalion, brigade, and division level skills, as appropriate.”

Consequently, the pre mobilization training goals, as outlined in Title XI, should remain in force and be applied to the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions.

##### **6.5.2 Continued Performance of State Missions.**

Elements of the ARNG provide the primary means through which the governors of the states respond to a wide range of domestic emergencies, including natural disasters and civil disturbances (commonly referred to as “state missions”). These missions are, however, viewed universally as adjuncts to the operational (or “federal”) missions. Further, training time currently allotted to prepare for these

state missions is not sufficient to hamper overall readiness (based on a survey of current ERB training guidance and programs).

Two other factors influence this question:

- Exempting ARNG combat elements from state missions is unprecedented; consequently, the procedures and mechanisms by which this could be accomplished would need to be defined, and if necessary, developed.
- State governors require forces for the conduct of state missions; removing ERBs from the pool of available forces would place, at the very minimum, severe handicaps on states' ability to respond quickly and effectively. It is possible that exempting ERBs from state mission requirements could prevent a state governor from responding to state missions at all.

### *6.5.3 Pre Mobilization Training Strategy.*

The objective of pre mobilization training is to produce a unit as proficient in its mission essential task list (METL) as possible to reduce post mobilization training time required for deployment. To accomplish this for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division, a pre mobilization strategy must be constructed or the current modus for the ERBs validated.

During pre mobilization training, division units seek to meet the training goals established in FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2. These goals are summarized in Figure 6-1.

EXPECTED TRAINING LEVEL AT HANDOFF PREMOBILIZATION TO POSTMOBILIZATION	
-	SOLDIER QUALIFICATION (85 PERCENT ASSIGNED STRENGTH DMOSQ)
-	COLLECTIVE TRAINING THROUGH CREW, SECTION, TEAM AND SQUAD LEVEL (85 PERCENT OF ASSIGNED CREWS QUALIFIED TO TABLE VIII)
-	MANEUVER TRAINING AT PLATOON LEVEL (ATTACK, DEFEND, MOVEMENT TO CONTACT MANEUVER SKILLS DEMONSTRATED DURING LANE TRAINING) (70 PERCENT OF AGREED UPON TASKS EVALUATED "T" OR "P")
-	COMMAND AND STAFF TRAINING TO DEVELOP BATTALION, BRIGADE AND DIVISION LEVEL SKILLS (PROFICIENCY DURING BCTP, BCBST AND BCST, AS PRESCRIBED IN FORSCOM/ARNG REGULATION 350-2)
-	COMMON TASKS TEST, ARMY PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST, AND INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS QUALIFICATION (100 PERCENT SOLDIER COMPLETION WITHIN YEAR)

Figure 6-1 Pre mobilization Training Tasks

- Maneuver units (combat arms (CA) elements) focus their training at the platoon level. Infantry and Armor Units focus on platoon maneuver and crew gunnery qualification. When the platoon level competencies have been demonstrated in platoon collective tasks which support the company METL, CA units may proceed to higher levels of training. All other combat arms units (Field Artillery, Combat Aviation, Combat Engineers, Air Defense) train to minimum of company/battery level proficiency.
- Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) elements will train to company level proficiency during pre mobilization training. These units may move to battalion level collective training after attaining proficiency on company METL tasks which support the battalion METL tasks.

Division command group and staff sections train to those functions required to support division operations. Based on an analysis of FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2, FM 25-100, *Training the Force*, and FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, the pre mobilization training program includes the following 5 processes:

- Participation by the division and its major subordinate commands in the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) once every two years.
- Participation by the division's brigades and battalions in Brigade/Battalion Command Battle Staff Training (BCBST) during the alternate years. The division command group and its major subordinate commands are involved in this process.
- The division support elements will participate in Logistics Exercises (LOGEX) and other Battlefield Operating System (BOS) exercises every year.
- The division and its major subordinate commands develop and practice their respective Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) on a routine and recurring basis throughout its pre mobilization training program.
- The division and its major subordinate commands ensure effective planning, coordination, and execution procedures are established to ensure effective preparation for any and all exercises. The collective tasks for the division HHC and the division base units can be found at TAB 1 to Appendix J.

#### 6.5.4 Pre Mobilization Resource Requirements.

Alternatives 1 (as a division) and 3 contain division base units and require additional GFRE personnel. Figure 6-2 provides an estimate of the additional RTD essential for training the division MSCs and other related units to the same training readiness as the BCTs. This figure is predicated on two conditions: the division base units are ARNG; and the ARNG units are replaced in the ARNG force structure. Because Alternative 2 is focused on only ERBs, these additional requirements are not applicable.

<b>DIV HHC</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>ADA BN (w/ GS CO )</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>DIVARTY</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>MI BN (HHC &amp; GS CO)</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>MLRS BN</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>SIG BN</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>DISCOM</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>MP CO</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>MSB</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>CM CO</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>AVN MAINT BN</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>BAND</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>EN BDE</b>	<b>4</b>		
<b>AVN BDE</b>	<b>4</b>		
<b>ATK BNs</b>	<b>7</b>		
<b>GS AVN BN</b>	<b>5</b>		
<b>CAV SQDRN</b>	<b>6</b>		
<b>TOTAL = 94</b>			

Figure 6-2 Additional RTD Requirements

#### 6.5.5 Unique Training Requirements.

The unique training requirements associated with each of the alternatives were also analyzed. The results of this analysis is described at Tab 2 to Appendix F. Generally, the results of the analysis are:

- *Training Opportunities:* Alternative 2 takes the best advantage of training opportunities presented because it creates the least turbulence of the three alternatives. The principal purpose of the division HHC in Alternative 2 is to facilitate training and active component support and to evaluate the three ERBs.

- *Use of Battle Projection Centers (BPC), Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), Warfighter (WFX) exercises, Corps and Division level exercises:* Alternative 2 is the simplest. It causes little or no changes to these types of training experiences because they would not be done under this Alternative.
- *Training Products and Documentation:* For the most part, current or planned training products are or will be available to support any of the three alternatives. Currently available ARTEP and Mission Training Plans (MTP) adequately cover brigade, battalion and units below that level. A revised final draft of an ARTEP/MTP for Division Command Group and Staff was used to develop collective tasks for those Division HHC elements. (As of this writing, no ARTEP/MTP was available for either the DIVARTY or the Military Intelligence (CEWI) Battalion nor was a Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS) available for the Division HHC. This deficiency applies equally to both active and reserve component units.)

#### *6.5.6 Training Responsibilities.*

Tab 3 to Appendix F provides a detailed analysis of the training responsibilities attendant to each alternative. Ultimately, the division commander is responsible for training the division's elements under any of the three alternatives.

#### *6.5.7 Leader Development Requirements.*

Tab 4 to Appendix F provides a detailed analysis of the leader development requirements associated with the three AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives. Alternative 2 is the easiest to implement because there are no division command and control nor combat support/combat service support elements to develop as a team. Both Alternatives 1 and 3 are more difficult to manage because of the presence of such elements. Of these, Alternative 1 is the more difficult because it requires the division to split its training between training as ERBs and as an AOE division.

### **6.6. OBSERVATIONS.**

- There is no objective or subjective basis upon which to recommend that Section 1119, Title XI be repealed or amended. There is broad consensus between the executive and legislative branches, among the Services, and between the active and reserve components, on both the propriety and the feasibility of the current pre mobilization training standards.

- There appears to be no reason to exempt ERBs from state missions. Further, no apparent precedents or mechanisms exist to accomplish such action. Therefore, exemption of ERBs from state missions is not recommended.
- Additional pre mobilization training support personnel are required for Alternative 1 (as a division) and Alternative 3.
- Standard leader development requirements (Institutional Training, Organizational Experiences, and Self Development) pose no major management problems under any of the alternatives. A unique leader requirement to develop the division as a “team” presents differing degrees of difficulty to implement.

## **Chapter Seven POST MOBILIZATION TRAINING**

### **7.1 OBJECTIVE.**

The objective is to identify the mobilization to deployment process and supporting training requirements for the three AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives and determine the best alternative for achieving training readiness and force power in the shortest time.

### **7.2 APPROACH.**

The methodology for reaching the objective included:

- Analyzing the processes, times, and resources used in current AC and RC divisions and major subordinate commands (MSC).
- Assessing the pre mobilization training strategy and training environment for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division.
- Postulating a post mobilization training environment for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division.
- Developing division and MSC post mobilization training strategies based on the postulated strategy and environments, to include:
  - Determining the events and actions required to raise and sustain the ARNG Division to deployable proficiency and performance levels.
  - Determining the primary events and requirements needed to reach training and deployment standards in the most effective and efficient manner.
- Comparing the postulated division training strategies against the ARNG Enhanced Readiness Brigade training strategy contained in FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 to eliminate conflicts, and to ensure all major requirements are addressed.
- Developing timelines to support alternative training strategies from mobilization to deployment.
- Determining additional training resources required to meet deployment schedules.

### **7.3 ASSUMPTIONS.**

The following assumptions were generated to support the analytical and development process:

- Effective exercise preparation and execution is planned and practiced.
- Sufficient training resources are available for three BCT capable training sites
- Equipment requires minimal maintenance before training begins, and sufficient spare parts and ammunition are available for high OPTEMPO training.
- The post mobilization training model contained in FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2 is appropriate for training the brigade combat teams (BCT). The only exception is the Cavalry which trains as a squadron.
- Post Mobilization strategies are developed and analyzed without specific units of the ARNG being identified.
- Other MSCs train in accordance with division combat support mission requirements, and within the BCT training time lines.
- Post Mobilization training is performed to standard.

### **7.4 DATA SOURCES.**

The data sources used to develop the post mobilization training requirements can be found in Tab 2 to Appendix G .

### **7.5 FINDINGS.**

#### **7.5.1 *Alternative 1 (as separate brigades) and Alternative 2***

FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2 outlines the post mobilization training strategy for enhanced readiness brigades. This strategy is applicable to both the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Alternative 1 when it is employed as separate brigades and to the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Alternative 2 which has three ERBs and an active component division HHC. The following paragraphs, tables and figures (through and including paragraph 7.5.1) are a synopsis of the strategy from FORSCOM /ARNG Regulation 350-2.

Post mobilization training is based on the presumption that the ERBs enter post mobilization training proficient in their assigned pre mobilization training tasks (See Figure 6-1).

Not all ERBs may need to undergo training at the warfighting centers. For example, if the ERB is replacing an active component stationed overseas that has been deployed to an MRC, then the ERB may not need to go to a warfighting center before replacing the active component brigade. However, if the ERB is expected to engage an enemy force or the situation may escalate to this eventuality, then the ERB will undergo post mobilization training at a warfighting center. The final decision regarding each ERB's attendance at the warfighting center resides with the Commander, FORSCOM.

Figure 7-2 depicts the specific regulatory battle tasks to be accomplished by the ERBs while they are at the warfighting centers. These tasks are designed to hone the skills necessary to meet the mission requirements of the ERBs - ATTACK, DEFEND, and MOVEMENT TO CONTACT.

<b>STANDARD MOVEOUT DAY</b> PERFORM TACTICAL ROAD MARCH OCCUPY ASSEMBLY AREA PROTECT THE FORCE PREPARE FOR OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS  <b>STANDARD MOVEMENT TO CONTACT</b> MOVE TACTICALLY EMPLOY FIRE SUPPORT REACT TO INDIRECT FIRE ATTACK/COUNTERATTACK BY FIRE ASSAULT - CONSOLIDATE TREAT/EVACUATE CASUALTIES PERFORM CSS OPERATIONS  <b>STANDARD PREPARATION FOR DELIBERATE ATTACK</b> PROTECT THE FORCE MAINTAIN OPERATIONAL SECURITY PERFORM INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS PREPARE FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS PERFORM CSS OPERATIONS  <b>STANDARD DELIBERATE ATTACK (DESTRUCTION)</b> MOVE TACTICALLY EMPLOY FIRE SUPPORT REACT TO INDIRECT FIRE ATTACK BY FIRE BREACH OBSTACLE ASSAULT CONSOLIDATE TREAT/EVACUATE CASUALTIES PERFORM CSS OPERATIONS	<b>STANDARD DELIBERATE ATTACK (PENETRATION)</b> MOVE TACTICALLY/EMPLOY FIRE SUPPORT REACT TO INDIRECT FIRE ATTACK BY FIRE BREACH DEFENSE OBSTACLE ASSAULT PENETRATE CONSOLIDATE CONDUCT HASTY DEFENSE TREAT/EVACUATE CASUALTIES PERFORM CSS OPERATIONS  <b>STANDARD PREPARATION FOR DEFENSE IN SECTOR</b> PERFORM SCREEN PROTECT THE FORCE MAINTAIN OPERATIONAL SECURITY PERFORM SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS PERFORM CSS OPERATIONS  <b>STANDARD DEFENSE IN SECTOR</b> PERFORM SCREEN PROTECT THE FORCE MAINTAIN OPERATIONAL SECURITY EMPLOY FIRE SUPPORT REACT TO INDIRECT FIRE DEFEND ATTACK/COUNTERATTACK BY FIRE CONSOLIDATE TREAT/EVACUATE CASUALTIES PERFORM CSS OPERATIONS  <b>DEEP ATTACK</b> MOVE TACTICALLY EMPLOY FIRE SUPPORT ATTACK BY FIRE PERFORM CSS OPERATIONS
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Figure 7-1 Specific Battle Tasks

There are four training sites/warfighting centers that possess the requisite area, instrumentation, trainers, OPFOR and post support to train the ERBs:

- The NTC at Fort Irwin, CA trains mechanized brigades;
- Fort Hood, TX trains heavy brigades;
- Fort Polk, LA trains light brigades; and
- Fort Lewis, WA trains light brigades/Yakima trains heavy brigades.

Figure 7-2 shows the notional flow of ERBs through these training sites/warfighting centers. For purposes of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept study, the emphasis is on the mechanized and heavy brigades - those units that would notionally use the NTC, Fort Hood and Yakima.




Figure 7-2 Notional Flow of ERBs

Three heavy ERBs and one light ERB can be trained and ready to move to port by approximately mobilization (M) plus 90 days (M+90); three additional heavy ERBs and one additional light ERB can be trained and ready by M+140. However, the accessibility of the heavy brigade training sites may impact these availability times. Fort Hood and Yakima will be used by AC units training for the second MRC until M+17 to M+30. Therefore, ERBs scheduled to train at these locations must await the departure of the AC units before the training site can be used by the ERBs.

Figure 7-3, which is drawn from FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2, shows how the ERBs are sequenced through the training sites/warfighting centers. The first four ERBs are trained by their commander and RTD during home station mobilization training. The Regional Training Brigades (RTB) assist the ERBs as early as possible, but not later than M+20, and remain intricately involved with training the ERBs at the warfighting centers. It is expected that active component associated divisions and brigades have already deployed or are no longer available to assist.




Figure 7-3 Sequencing of ERBs

There are many different organizations involved with post mobilization training of the ERBs. Each organization is charged with certain responsibilities to ensure the ERBs are trained and ready by the required deployment time. Figure 7-4, from FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2, outlines the notional organizations involved in the ERB post mobilization training at Fort Hood and Yakima. The figure shows the organizations and the functions that they perform. Similar organizations and functions exist for the ERBs performing post mobilization training at Fort Polk and the NTC.

FUNCTION	RESPONSIBILITY AT	
	FORT HOOD	YAKIMA
Validation of Enhanced Brigade Trained and Ready for Deployment	CG FORSCOM	CG FORSCOM
Aided by and Command and command group. Warfighting Center appointed by Composite Postmobilization Trainers	Cdr. Warfighting Center CG Fifth Army (MAT)  CG, III Corps RTB Sam Houston RTB Knox FEB, 75th Div Ex BCST Bde, 75th Div Ex ORE, Fifth Army	Cdr. Warfighting Center CG, First Army (MAT)  CG, I Corps RTB Lewis RTB Carson FEB, 91st Div Ex BCST Bde, 91st Div Ex ORE, First Army
Additional Trainer Requirements	CG, Fifth Army	CG, First Army
Mobile Training Teams (MTT)	National Training Center	National Training Center
Mobilization Assistance Teams (MAT)	CG, Fifth Army	CG, First Army
Assist Fill of Enhanced Brigade Personnel, Equipment	MS/STARC/NGB TAG of Enhanced Brigade Home Station	MS/STARC/NGB TAG of Enhanced Brigade Home Station
Opposing Force (OPFOR)	ARNG Division To be determined	ARNG Division To be determined
Infrastructure Support	Cdr. Fort Hood	Cdr. Fort Lewis and Yakima

RTB - Regional Training Brigade  
 FEB - Field Exercise Brigade  
 BCST - Battle Command Staff Training  
 ORE - Operational Readiness Evaluation

Figure 7-4 Functions and Responsibilities between Fort Hood and Yakima

7.5.2 *Alternative 1 (as an AOE division) and Alternative 3*

We now transition from FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2 to a discussion of analysis performed by the RAND Arroyo Center.

One of the critical issues in the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study is “what is the post mobilization training strategy for an integrated division and how long will it take to prepare an integrated division for deployment?” To answer these two questions, the RAND Arroyo Center was asked to examine: the specific training tasks that must be accomplished to prepare an AC/ARNG Integrated Division to execute the missions of ATTACK, DEFEND, and MOVEMENT TO CONTACT, as well as the need to carry out any specific missions desired by the gaining CINC; training sites that are available to support the strategy; and the time required to execute the post mobilization training strategy for an integrated division. In addition, RAND identified the resources required to support the strategy. (See Appendix G for a full explanation of the RAND Arroyo analysis.)

The specific training and time requirements for the division and MSC command and staff are displayed in Table 7-1 “Post Mobilization Training Events.” The table shows the specific event, the duration of the training event and the applicability of the training event to the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Alternative. In some instances, these events mirror the events that are also required for pre mobilization training.

Table 7-1 Post Mobilization Training Events

Training Event Post Mobilization	Duration	Alt 1	Alt 2	Alt 3
Individual/Section Training	8 Days	X		X
Command Post (CP) Drill and Order Drills	10 Days	X		X
Map Exercises (MAPEX) and Command Post Exercises (w/o Brigades)	TBD	X		X
BCTP Seminar	8 Days	X		X
BCTP Ramp-up Training	20 Days	X		X
WARFIGHTER Exercise	15 Days Preceded by 5 Days of Div Order Prep	X		X
Division FTX (1 Bde Combat Team)	8 Days (3 days of prep inclusive.)	X		X
LOGEX/BOS Exercises (during ramp-up to CPX and BCTP)	As required	X		X

Adequate facilities are available to support three brigade training sites. Six locations (Fort Irwin, CA; Fort Carson (and Pinon Canyon), CO; Yakima, WA; Fort Hood, TX; Fort Riley, KS, and Fort Bliss, Texas are shown in Figure 7-5) have sufficient capability to support brigade training. More significant issues are the M-day availability of three posts: Forts Hood and Carson and Yakima. AC units training for deployment to the second MRC would occupy these locations until about M+17 to M+30. ARNG training at these locations can not start until the respective AC units have departed.




Figure 7-5 Location of Training Centers

Three post mobilization training strategies were postulated and analyzed by the RAND Arroyo Center to support the division deployment required by AC/ARNG Integrated Division Alternatives 1 and 3. (Note: Alternative 2 was not examined as it would never be trained as a division.) However, it must be understood that until specific brigades and supporting units are identified by name to form the two AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions, final training location combinations cannot be specifically selected. Therefore, the strategies outlined below are postulated on likely/possible unit selections, the best training location combinations to accomplish the mission, and the availability of training sites. Should the AC be using the sites for post alert training, time requirements for each of the three strategies is subject to change. It should further be noted that none of the three strategies are applicable to Alternative 2 for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division. This Alternative is governed by a RAND analysis entitled, *Post Mobilization Training Resource Requirements: Army National Guard Heavy Enhanced Brigades*, which specifies that ERBs are ready for deployment in about 90 days. Full page diagrams for each of the three strategies and supporting documentation can be found in Appendix G to this report.




Figure 7-6 Training Strategy A

Strategy A (Figure 7-6) calls for three brigade combat teams (BCTs) to train concurrently at three different training sites. The division HHC, aviation brigade, and cavalry squadron co-locate at one BCT training site. With concurrent mobilization and call up, the first division is ready to deploy during the period from M+132 to M+135. The second division, with three gunnery sites, is ready to deploy during the period from M+217 to M+220. However, this strategy restricts the ability to train the remaining heavy ERBs. None of the remaining heavy ERBs can use any of the three sites (Fort Hood, NTC, or Yakima) until the second AC/ARNG Integrated Division has cleared.




Figure 7-7 Training Strategy B

Strategy B (Figure 7-7) calls for one division training site with all BCT completing battalion and BCT maneuver training at Fort Irwin. This is accomplished by the division HHC, the first BCT, the aviation brigade, and the cavalry squadron reporting directly to Fort Irwin. The two other BCTs from the division deploy to two company level training sites and execute gunnery training using company team lanes. When this training is completed, the BCTs deploy to Fort Irwin in a staggered sequence as space became available. With concurrent mobilization and call-up, and depending on site availability, the first division is ready to deploy during the period of M+185 to M+188. The second division is ready to deploy during the period from M+ 303 to M+ 309. Similar to strategy A, none of the remaining heavy ERBs can concurrently train at the three sites and must await the second AC/ARNG Integrated Division to clear before they can begin training.




Figure 7-8 Training Strategy C

Strategy C (Figure 7-8) uses two division training sites. All maneuver training is completed at the division training site. To execute this strategy, the division HHC, the first BCT, the aviation brigade, and the cavalry squadron report directly to the division training site. The other two BCTs deploy to gunnery training sites to complete gunnery training and platoon drills. BCT maneuver training is staggered into the division training site as space became available. Another brigade training site could be opened to train other BCTs or the ACR. With

concurrent mobilization and call-up, both divisions are ready to deploy at M+ 239.

Table 7-2 shows a summation of the outcomes from the three post mobilization training strategies. An assessment of each of the three strategies follows the table.

**Table 7-2 Total Time to Produce a Division**

	<b>Strategy A</b>	<b>Strategy B</b>	<b>Strategy C</b>
Division 1	M+132 to M+135	M+185 to M+188	M+239
Division 2	M+217 to M+220	M+303 to M+309	M+239

Strategy A potentially takes the least amount of time (M+132 for the first division), and provides the best potential for force generation. Conversely, it is the most risky in terms of training schedule disruptions, and it provides the least potential for:

- Training oversight and team building.
- Integrating and training division operations and support for all MSCs.

Strategy B is a middle of the road approach. Although it is less risky, it is the most time consuming in terms of deployable force availability (M+309 for the second division versus M+220 or M+239).

Strategy C is slower in terms of force generation (M+239 for the first division versus M+135 or M+188), but it provides the best capability to:

- Exercise training oversight and team building.
- Integrate and train division operations and support for all MSCs.
- Generate BCTs or ACRs and divisions simultaneously.

### *7.5.3 Post Mobilization Resource Requirements*

*Alternative 1 (as separate brigades) and Alternative 2.*

The personnel resource requirements for training three ERBs in approximately 90 days are 18,000 to 20,000. Table 7-3 provides a detail breakdown of these requirements.

**Table 7-3 Personnel Requirements to Mobilize 3 Brigades**

Requirement	Number of Personnel
Garrison Support Augmentation	5,000-7,000
ARNG OPFOR	11,000
AC Training Support	1,800
ARNG Training Support	1,000

RC garrison support augmentation: The 5,000 to 7,000 spaces assume a low level of residual garrison support resulting from deployment of personnel, supply, maintenance, ordnance, and other support units that have deployed with AC forces.

ARNG OPFOR: The 11,000 space requirement is based on the premise that a brigade size OPFOR is required to train a BCT, and that the NTC OPFOR, if available, is not sufficient to fill ARNG division requirements in a timely manner.

AC training support: The 1,800 space requirement is for training and training management personnel.

ARNG training support: The 1,000 personnel provide training support for training lanes and ranges, and field support, e.g., maintenance and supply.

Additionally, other RC units need to be called up to support post mobilization. These include post management, garrison support and infrastructure operations (e.g., signal, engineer) units.

*Alternative 1 (as a division) and Alternative 3.*

FORSCOM has programmed sufficient AC to RC assets to operate the three ERB training sites. These assets do not account for the division MSCs or the divisional and MSC training events included in the RAND training strategies A, B, and C. In addition to the 94 additional personnel required for the RTDs (see Chapter 6), there is a post mobilization trainer requirement of 115 AC training personnel and one or two BCTP teams per AC/ARNG Integrated Division. Figure 7-9 outlines these additional post mobilization training requirements.

<b>DIV HHC</b>	<b>BCTP</b>	<b>ADA BN (w/ GS CO)</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>DIVARTY</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>MI BN (HHC &amp; GS CO)</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>MLRS BN</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>SIG BN</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>DISCOM</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>MP CO</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>MSB</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>CM CO</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>AVN MAINT BN</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>BAND</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>EN BDE</b>	<b>0</b>		
<b>AVN BDE</b>	<b>2</b>		
<b>ATK BNs</b>	<b>13</b>		
<b>GS AVN BN</b>	<b>8</b>		
<b>CAV SQDRN</b>	<b>27</b>		
<b>TOTAL = 115 (plus the BCTP trainers and support)</b>			

Figure 7-9 Additional AC Training Personnel Required for One AC/ARNG Integrated Division

Table 7-4 provides a summary of the total additional AC trainers needed for each AC/ARNG Integrated Division. The 209 personnel for Alternative 1 (as a division) and Alternative 3 includes both the 94 additional personnel for the RTDs and the 115 post mobilization trainers. All are needed to train the divisional MSCs and other selected units present in Alternative 1 (as a division) and Alternative 3. Alternative 1 (as separate brigades) and Alternative 2 do not require additional personnel — there are no division MSCs.

Table 7-4 Total Requirements Above Baseline to Train One AC/ARNG Division

<b>Alternative</b>	<b>Difference</b>
1	+209
2	0
3	+209

## 7.6 OBSERVATIONS.

Direct post mobilization training responsibility for the Integrated Divisions follows the conceptual structure of the three alternatives.

- In Alternatives 1 (as a division) and 3, the division HHC trains the division, as well as prepares to deploy with the division as the division command and control element.

- In Alternative 2, the division HHC commands the warfighting center and assists with post mobilization training by prescribing, assisting, evaluating and validating the post mobilization training of its constituent BCTs. The division HHC does not deploy with the BCTs.
- In the broader perspective, FORSCOM, through its subordinate corps and CONUSAs, coordinates and executes post mobilization activities once units arrive at the mobilization station.

Based on a comparison of the times required to train three ERBs separately, or as part of a division, it will take longer to train the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions.

- One division from Alternative 1 or Alternative 3 will take at least 30 days longer to train than three ARNG ERBs.
- Two divisions from Alternative 1 or Alternative 3 will take at least 60 days longer to train than six ARNG ERBs.

Faster train-up strategies incur more risk and are less flexible than slower train-up strategies.

Slower train-up strategies may not meet deployment requirements. (Addressed in Chapter 8 Force Implications.)

Additional pre and post mobilization training and training support personnel are required for Alternatives 1 and 3:

- The RTDs and post mobilization trainers.
- BCTP teams.

The unavailability of AC trainers for post mobilization training due to deployment and the requirement to train second MRC AC forces for deployment, is a serious concern. Their unavailability will certainly extend the training time, particularly in Alternatives 1 and 3.

**Alternative 1** is the most risky option. Although the BCTs undergo some peacetime training as divisional MSCs, the decision to reorganize as an AOE division at mobilization, establish the command and staff relationships, fill and train new CS and CSS organizations at the same time the organization is attempting to meet the deployment schedule, is a difficult assignment. If Alternative 1 is selected for implementation, training strategy C (two division training sites) provides the best chance for success. This strategy provides the

best capability for division training oversight and team building, and the opportunity to integrate and train division operations and support.

Based on the pre and post mobilization training analysis, and recognizing the strong competition for meager resources, **Alternative 2** (three ERBs trained by an AC HHC) provides the best assurance for achieving training readiness and generating force power. **Alternative 2**, using the first training strategy (separate BCT training locations), appears to provide the best chance for success. It is essentially the status quo, requires the least resources, is the least risky, and creates the least turbulence to execute. The negative side of this course of action is it does not result in a division force.

**Alternative 3** is the next best option because the division organizes and trains as an AOE division from the beginning. Upon mobilization, there should be no major surprises. The command and staff relationships that go to war have been established. Because of these relationships, and no requirement for major unit reorganization, the division is in a much better position to meet its post mobilization training requirements using either the second or third training strategy.

## **Chapter Eight FORCE IMPLICATIONS**

This chapter is classified and is published as Volume II - Force Implications (see 1.10 of this Main Report).



## Chapter Nine RESOURCES

### 9.1 OBJECTIVE.

This chapter addresses the *marginal* costs associated with implementing each of the three alternative designs for the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions. *Marginal costs* are defined as those costs that are above those associated with the three ERBs used as the basis for each AC/ARNG Integrated Division. In addition, the resource analysis investigated the personnel (to include total personnel, full time support, and GFRE) and EAD/EAC requirements to support each of the three alternative designs.

### 9.2 METHODOLOGY.

The marginal cost analysis for ADRS had five components: procurement, OPTEMPO, retraining, facilities, and environmental impacts. For AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions, only two components are considered: procurement and operationing tempo (OPTEMPO). Each of these cost elements has its own unique cost methodology for determining marginal cost.

Retraining cost for the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions was not considered. There is no guarantee that there will be any personnel retraining cost. In the ADRS, the population used to form new units was known. For the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions, the population used to form new units is unknown. Therefore, the cost to retrain soldiers forming the new units contained in the three alternative designs for the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions can range from nothing (all requirements are met by MOS-qualified personnel) to retraining all required personnel for new units above those in the ERBs. Facilities and environmental costs were not considered for two reasons. First, facilities costs are highly site specific. Second, the Army as a whole has facilities available given the most recent round of base closures and realignments.

#### 9.2.1 Procurement Methodology.

Each of the three alternatives employed a common procurement methodology. However, the structure associated with each alternative required separate processing to identify the structure for which costs would be determined. In general, the procurement methodology compared the OTOE equipment requirements for the ERBs against the total OTOE structure requirements for each alternative design. In those cases where the equipment matched at the line item

number (LIN) level of detail, the required quantities were compared to determine if there was a shortage or an excess for the particular item. If the alternative design contained less equipment than the AOE division, the shortage was procured as new equipment. If there was an excess quantity of equipment for the respective LIN, the excess was identified as available for redistribution and a cost was computed for second destination transportation. No attempt was made to use the excess equipment as substitutes or ILO items within the alternative nor was any attempt made to identify cascading equipment from other units that could be used to offset equipment shortfalls.

#### *Alternative 1*

The procurement methodology for this alternative has two steps. The first step determines the equipment required for the division base (to include the division HHC). This is accomplished by:

- Identifying those units in the division base that are not present in the ERBs (e.g., the aviation units, the MLRS battalion);
- Identifying those units within the within the ERBs that satisfy full or partial division base structure (e.g., the ERBs have ground cavalry troops similar to those found in the division cavalry squadron); and
- Decrementing the common type units in the ERBs from the division base requirements to reflect the equipment and personnel not present in the ERBs and must be procured.

The second step of the procurement process for Alternative 1 compares the equipment requirements for an AOE against the combined equipment requirements for the division base and the ERBs. This comparison results in a listing of equipment shortages that must be procured to match an AOE division and a listing of equipment within Alternative 1 that is excess to the AOE division requirements. The shortages and the excess equipment results from this alternative not forming into an AOE division until post mobilization.

#### *Alternative 2*

The procurement for Alternative 2 is determined based on a listing of equipment developed by the Study Director for a division HHC whose sole mission is coordinating training.

#### *Alternative 3*

The procurement methodology for Alternative 3 compares the OTOE equipment requirements for the ERBs against the OTOE requirements for an AOE division. Where the requirements match at LIN level of detail, the quantities are compared

to determine if there is a shortage or an excess for the particular item. Where the AOE division requirement exceeds the structure for the Alternative 3 design, the shortage is procured as new equipment. Where the requirements for Alternative 3 design exceed the requirements for the AOE division, a second destination cost is developed for the excess equipment items.

#### *9.2.2 OPTEMPO Methodology.*

The direct OPTEMPO cost refers to the cost to operate a system on an annual basis for a set unit of measure (e.g., miles or annual hours). The basic components of the direct OPTEMPO cost are petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) cost; consumable parts (such as spark plugs) cost; reparables (such as engines) cost; the mileage/hours associated with the respective item of equipment; and the total quantity of the equipment item. Two direct OPTEMPO costs are computed for each alternative design.

- The first direct OPTEMPO cost has the division headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) and the division base (that portion of the division which has the elements above the ERB requirements) as purely an active component entity and the ERBs as ARNG.
- The second OPTEMPO cost has the division HHC as an active component and the division base and ERBs as ARNG.

For each of these two computations, a direct OPTEMPO cost is determined for the respective alternative design and compared against the direct OPTEMPO cost for the three ERBs. All units are computed at ALO1/C1. The marginal cost for each alternative is represented by the difference between the OPTEMPO cost for the three ERBs and the OPTEMPO cost for the division as a whole. Each alternative, therefore, has two marginal OPTEMPO costs: one with an active component HHC and division slice and one with an active component HHC and an ARNG division slice.

### **9.3 ASSUMPTIONS.**

Prior to initiation of the cost analysis, certain basic assumptions were made:

- The end strength of the active component and the ARNG is unchanged.
- The active component has 10 divisions; the ARNG has 8 divisions configured in accordance with the Secretary of the Army's decision of 23 May 1996 for the Army National Guard Redesign Study (ADRS).

- All costs are computed against the objective tables of organization and equipment (OTOE) structures for the ERBs and the AOE heavy division structure.
- To the extent possible, the cost analysis and data bases for the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions mirrors the analysis used in the ADRS.
- Any equipment currently on hand in the ERBs and used as substitutes or in lieu of (ILO) items will continue to be used as substitutes or ILO items.

#### 9.4 DATA SOURCES.

For procurement items, the item prices were obtained from Supply Bulletin 700-20 or from the U.S. Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center (CEAC). For direct OPTEMPO costs, the data sources were the battalion level training model (BLTM)/training resource model (TRM), the Force Organization Cost Estimating System (FORCES) - the official CEAC cost model, and CEAC cost factors.

#### 9.5 FINDINGS.

The table below shows the marginal cost results for a *single division* for the three alternative designs. All dollars are in FY96\$M. It should be noted that procurement costs are one time costs while direct OPTEMPO costs are recurring (e.g., OPTEMPO costs must be paid every year). Appendix H contains a listing of the equipment shortages and overages used to compute the procurement costs for each alternative. In addition, TABs 6, 7, and 8 to Appendix H contain the unique methodologies used to compute direct OPTEMPO costs for each alternative.

Table 9-1 Comparison of Alternatives to Cost Elements

Cost Element	Alt 1	Alt 2	Alt 3
Procurement	\$1,512.6M	\$4.6M	\$1,428.3M
Direct OPTEMPO			
- AC HHC & Div Base	\$34.4M	\$0.4M	\$36.7M
AC HHC & ARNG Div Base	\$17.1M	N/A	\$18.6M

##### 9.5.1 Alternative 1.

In this Alternative, the ERBs remain in tact and the division base is decremented to reflect the capabilities in the ERBs. Post Mobilization, this Alternative may be reconfigured into an AOE division if warranted. The cost for the division base (to include the division HHC) is \$1,331.1M. If a decision is made to transform this Alternative into a pure AOE division (vice a decremented division base and three

intact ERBs), an additional \$181.5M must be expended to obtain additional equipment requirements. Although there is a procurement cost of \$1.3B for this Alternative (the cost of the division base and the additional equipment needed for a true AOE division), there is also excess equipment (\$167M) because of duplication maintained between the ERBs and the division base if an AOE division is not formed. Most significant among the excess items are Bradley fighting vehicles and Avengers. These two items comprise over 65 percent of the total excess. This equipment can be viewed as either a cost avoidance (e.g., the equipment does not need to be procured if Alternative 1 is used as a division) or as an added cost because the ERBs must remain in their current configuration until a decision is made during post mobilization to employ the division as a division or as separate brigades. TABs 1, 2 and 5 to Appendix H, respectively, contain a complete listing of the equipment required in the division base, the additional equipment to move the Alternative to a pure AOE division, and the excess equipment from this Alternative.

Aviation procurement for Alternative 1 (attack and lift helicopters) comprise 75 percent of the total procurement bill. Aviation units also consume 50 percent of the OPTEMPO dollars regardless of whether the units are active component or ARNG.

#### *9.5.2 Alternative 2.*

The costs for this Alternative are based on a stylized configuration for the division HHC (see TAB 3 to Appendix H). Should the configuration be changed to a different mix of equipment or to different quantities of equipment, both the procurement cost and the OPTEMPO costs would change. Additionally, this Alternative has only one OPTEMPO cost. The division HHC is always active component and there is no division base associated with this Alternative.

#### *9.5.3 Alternative 3.*

This Alternative is configured as an AOE division in both pre and post mobilization. The procurement cost and the OPTEMPO costs, therefore, represent the absolute differences between the three ERBs and the AOE division. As in Alternative 1, there is excess equipment because of the different configurations between units within the ERBs and the AOE divisional units. The excess equipment total is \$123M, a 33 percent reduction from Alternative 1. Also, the aviation assets represent the largest percentage of the procurement cost (70 percent) and the aviation units consume over 50 percent of the OPTEMPO dollars regardless of whether the units are active component or ARNG. TABs 4 and 5 to Appendix H, respectively, show the equipment procurement quantities

for Alternative 3. TAB 5 to Appendix H compares the excess equipment quantities from Alternative 1 and Alternative 3.

#### 9.5.4 Other Resource Considerations

**Personnel.** Chapters 2 and 3 provided a synopsis of the three AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives. However, all three alternatives require additional personnel to form each of the respective different divisional structure alternatives. The table below is a summation of the personnel requirements for each alternative.

**Table 9-2 Personnel Requirements for Alternatives 1, 2, and 3**

<b>Alt</b>	<b>Div HHC</b>	<b>Div Base</b>	<b>Maneuver Bdes</b>	<b>Total</b>
1	288	4,593	13,704	18,945
2	302	N/A	13,704	14,006
3	288	5,118	12,627	18,033

Alternative 2 requires the fewest number of additional personnel (302) to implement. The three ERBs remain intact and a stylized HHC is used as a division HHC. Alternative 1 requires the largest number of personnel (5,241). Although the division HHC and division base are decremented because like/similar type units exist in the ERBs, some redundancies exist because:

- One-to-one decrements are not always possible because of different TOEs and concepts; and,
- The division HHC and division base units must still retain the capability to conduct section level training

Although Alternative 3 is a pure AOE division, 4,329 additional personnel are required. The ERBs are transformed into divisional maneuver brigades and task organized to maintain comparable capabilities. In addition, the potential exists for higher personnel shortfalls for Alternatives 1 and 3 if they are given the same consideration for overstructure in the division base as the ERBs.

**Full Time Support Requirements.** The base design for Alternative 2 (a stylized division HHC and 3 ERBs) does not generate any additional full time support requirements. The division HHC is active component and requirements for the 3 ERBs remain unchanged. Both Alternatives 1 and 2 have the potential to generate additional full time support requirements. The largest impact is brought about if the entire division base (less the division HHC) is ARNG. Each unit within the division base (with the exception of the Band) can generate a requirement for 1 or more Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel and military technicians. If the ARNG division base is given the same consideration as the ERBs, the

requirements for AGRs and military technician personnel will be higher than the requirements for a normal ARNG division.

**Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement (GFRE) Requirements.** Combining six ERBs into two AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions impacts the existing GFRE structure; however, the precise degree of the impact depends on:

- Organizing two AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions under Alternatives 1 or 3; and,
- Whether division base units (if any) would be built from existing ARNG structure, and if so, whether those elements would be replaced.

The best case scenario is Alternative 2, which leaves the ERBs in their original configuration and has a stylized active component HHC. Impacts on GFRE are negligible, if at all. The worst case scenario for GFRE is:

- Organizing two AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions under Alternative 3; and,
- Replacing with new force structure those ARNG units which were used to form the division base.

The additional personnel requirements generated under this worst case scenario cannot be predicted with precision, since there are no formal apportionment rules for GFRE elements. However, extrapolating from recent experience in activating and aligning existing GFRE structure allows an estimation of these requirements. The pre and post mobilization requirements for a single AC/ARNG Integrated Division are shown in Table 9-3 on the next page.

While the precise impact on the GFRE structure can be not described definitively (owing to the large number of potential organizational permutations), approximately 200 additional personnel per AC/ARNG Integrated Division would be needed to provide the necessary additional RTD capabilities under the worst case. These requirements are over and above the GFRE authorizations today and are also in addition to the AC personnel needed to man the AC/ARNG Integrated Division HHC.

Table 9-3 Estimated Additional RTD and Post Mobilization Personnel Requirements for One AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions

Element	Additional Personnel	Remarks
Division HHC	0	BCTP
Division Artillery	6	
MLRS Battalion	17	
Division Support Command	12	
Main Support Battalion	22	
AVIM Battalion	12	
Engineer Brigade	4	HHC only; Bns drawn from E-Bdes
Aviation Brigade	6	
Attack Helicopter Bn	20	1 Bn per Bde
GS Aviation Battalion	13	
Air Cavalry Squadron	33	
Air Defense Battalion	21	with GS Company
MI Battalion	22	HHC and GS Company
Signal Battalion	14	
MP Company	3	
Chemical Company	4	
Total for Alternative 3	209	+ BCTP Trainers and Support

**EAD/EAC Requirements.** When ERBs are introduced into a theater of operations, they do so as assets of existing corps or other divisions. The existing corps or divisions are responsible for providing the ERBs with the requisite CS/CSS support needed to sustain them while they are in the theater of operations. When a division is introduced into a theater of operations, however, it generates additional CS/CSS requirements that must be met to sustain it while the division is in the theater of operations. Such is the case with Alternatives 1 and 3. When Alternative 1 (as a division and not as separate brigades) or Alternative 3 is introduced into a theater of operations, there is a “division slice” requirement that must be met to sustain the division in the theater of operations. The division slice contains units ranging in size from two or three person detachments to entire battalions. The division slice itself generates additional requirements: transport into the theater of operations and sustainment while in the theater of operations. Tab 9, Appendix H displays the CS/CSS units in the division slice for *a single heavy division* and shows the type and number of unit required (both by SRC and by description) to support a single division and the size of the division slice (both in number of personnel and in weight).

**Mission Travel Requirements.** Chapter 10 will postulate several designs for the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions. Each design has one common tenet: all units

forming the Integrated Division have a geographic separation. Unlike active component units that are largely housed on a single installation, ARNG units are located in several different towns and states. The division commander and his staff, therefore, must travel to the various locations to attend planning conferences, oversee annual training, and attend to other administrative matters. These travel requirements may exceed those usually associated with active component units and must be taken into consideration when the initial annual budgets for the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions are formulated.

**Second Destination Transportation.** Both Alternatives 1 and 3 have excess equipment that requires redistribution. Alternative 1 excess equipment is generated when the division is reconfigured in post mobilization. Alternative 3 excess equipment is generated as soon as it is formed. During the pre mobilization period when Alternative 3 is formed, the equipment may be used to modernize other ARNG units, to increase the equipment fill of other ARNG units, or for other purposes within the ARNG. During the post mobilization period when Alternative 1 is formed, the excess equipment may be used to fill combat losses or elsewhere that it is needed. Therefore, the one-time cost for second destination transportation for Alternative 3 is truly a cost of forming the unit and should be considered; however, the exact cost is unknown because the disposition of the equipment is unknown - which ERBs form the alternative; which units will receive the excess equipment.

## **9.6 OBSERVATIONS.**

Several observations can be gleaned from both the procurement costs and the direct OPTEMPO costs for each alternative.

- In addition to aviation assets needed for Alternatives 1 and 3, there are other equipment shortfalls that could be significant - MLRS, AVENGER, wheeled vehicles (FMTV trucks, tractors and trailers).
- For Alternatives 1 and 3 (which have a division base), the quantities of equipment do not tell the complete picture. Each of these alternatives have whole units that must be added, e.g., an MLRS battalion and a general support air defense company. Procurement of equipment must be regulated to ensure that units received all needed items equipment in such a manner that they are combat ready as soon as possible.
- Some items of equipment needed for Alternatives 1 and 3 may not be available without first affecting on-going procurement action and fielding plans. For example, each of these alternatives has an attack helicopter

battalion consisting of AH-64D and RAH-66 airframes. The quantities needed to outfit the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions are in excess of quantities available to the Army. Therefore, changes must be made to have an attack helicopter battalion in each of the 2 divisions within each alternative.

- The end strength for both the active component (495K) and for the ARNG (367K) and the requirement for additional personnel for each alternative (ranging from 302 for Alternative 2 to 5,241 for Alternative 1) is a major consideration.
- Public Law 104-201, Section 212 sets the number of AGR personnel at 22,798. Implementing any of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives may cause an adjustment within the ARNG as a whole to satisfy all AGR requirements.
- Extracting additional GFRE personnel requirements from existing elements will have a deleterious impact on GFRE's operational capabilities. Any implementation plan should take this consideration into account, and provide cost-benefit analyses for any recommended options.

## **Chapter Ten IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES**

### ***10.1. INTRODUCTION.***

As the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study progressed toward maturity, it received significant exposure through the in-progress review briefing process. During these briefings, a number of concerns, recommendations, and alternative solutions were raised pertaining to the division HHC organization, structure, manning, e.g., basing and alignment of the ERBs. Each had potential for future consideration, but were not covered by the study plan. This chapter, therefore, is organized differently from the preceding chapters of this report. This chapter is not analytical in nature, but serves as a compendium of ideas that surfaced during the conduct of the study. It is not the intent of this chapter to evaluate these ideas, but to record them so they may be revisited in the future should an AC/ARNG Integrated Division design be implemented. Among the areas addressed in this chapter are:

- ERB alignment and division HHC type and location;
- Statutory and regulatory considerations;
- Funding streams for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division;
- Complementary methods of AC/RC integration;
- The command positions afforded to the ERBs in the event Alternatives 1 or 3 are selected; and
- Training support impacts of ERB selection.

### ***10.2 SELECTION OF THE ERBS FOR THE AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISION.***

The ARNG currently has 15 ERBs within its force structure: five mechanized infantry, two armor, one ACR, and seven infantry. The map at Figure 10-1 shows the geographic locations of these units.



- A *Southern Division* formed by the 256<sup>th</sup> ERB in Louisiana, the 155<sup>th</sup> ERB in Mississippi, and the 48<sup>th</sup> ERB in Georgia and the division HHC located at either Fort Polk, LA or Fort Gillem, GA.

A complete set of proposals from both FORSCOM and the ARNG can be found in Appendix J.

In addition to examining the potential alignment of the ERBs for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division, the type and composition of the division HHC was also investigated. In its current configuration, the division HHC for Alternative 2 is comprised of approximately 302 personnel in a TDA organization. Four excursions (seven optional designs) were examined as potential substitutes for the Alternative 2 design: augmentation of an existing garrison; augmentation of a CONUSA; a reduced TOE AOE HHC; and an integrated division HHC. The mission of Alternative 2 is that of training; thus, a TDA organization is most appropriate. Furthermore, a TDA design facilitates the warfighting center post mobilization mission. However, a transition to Alternative 1 or Alternative 3 at some future date (as appropriate) requires an AOE TOE design for the division HHC. The bottom line is that either a TDA organization or a TOE organization will work for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division HHC and both possess strong advantages. Appendix J contains an in depth discussion of the seven optional designs for the division HHC.

### ***10.3 EMPOWERING THE AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISION COMMANDER.***

Chapter 5 outlined the statutory and regulatory considerations for implementing an AC/ARNG Integrated Division and the problem faced with infusing an AC/ARNG Integrated Division into the current command climate. Among the many adjustments that must be considered to ensure the AC/ARNG Integrated Division commander is properly empowered are:

- Lines of authority/responsibility/accountability: State and Federal
- Requirements for Commissions within states
- Role of USP&FO
- Conduct of inspections
- Rating chain responsibilities
- School seat allocations/prioritization
- Federal recognition boards
- Military justice authority
- Allocation of AC assets
- Allocation/management of full time support: Title 32 and Technicians
- Title XI: Training program, readiness, resources, equipment compatibility

There are two ways to accomplish this empowerment, as shown in Figure 10-2.




Figure 10-2 Two Views of Command

The status quo (View 1) allows the TAGs to retain pre mobilization authority and limits the authority of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division commander, while Division C2 (View 2) transfers authority from the TAGs to the AC/ARNG Integrated Division commander. View 1 also requires a cultural change for the active component while View 2 requires a cultural change for the ARNG. View 1 is the easiest to implement but View 2 is the best long range choice for success. Common to both views is a memorandum of agreement (MOA) which sets forth the authority granted to the AC/ARNG Integrated Division commander.

In addition to outlining the duties and responsibilities of the respective parties involved, the MOA serves as an interim measure until more permanent regulations on the Federal side and standard agreements between the states and Federal participants can be established. The parties responsible for implementation must ensure that an MOA is in being before implementing any of the three alternative designs for AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions. A working copy of such an MOA can be found at TAB 2, Appendix J. This working document contains the major points to be addressed within the MOA and, for some areas, offers suggested wording.

#### 10.4 FUNDING STREAMS FOR AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISIONS.

In addition to alignments, type of division HHC to be used, and the statutory and regulatory considerations, the funding streams for the AC/ARNG Integrated divisions must also be resolved. Figure 10-3 shows one of several methods that

can be used to fund the National Guard segments of the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions. As the figure indicates, the funds can flow from the Director, Army National Guard to either FORSCOM or the AC/ARNG Integrated Division. A policy change can be made, however, that allows the dollars to flow directly from HQDA to either FORSCOM or the AC/ARNG Integrated Division. In addition to how the dollars flow to the AC/ARNG Integrated Division, the types of funding to be allocated must also be reviewed - operations and maintenance, Army National Guard (OMANG), National Guard Personnel, Army (NGPA), military construction, Army National Guard (MILCON, ARNG), and Army National Guard procurement.




Figure 10-3 Current and Potential Funding Stream for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division

### 10.5 COMPLEMENTARY METHODS OF AC/RC INTEGRATION.

The AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept is but one of several ongoing integration initiatives. During the course of this study effort, other means of integration were identified that can provide capabilities at a variety of levels within the AC/ARNG Integrated Division to address deficiencies, assist in resolving issues, and improve the overall AC-ARNG integration effort and understanding. Among these initiatives are:

- Use of AC officers in key leadership positions within the ARNG;
- Use of selected subordinate units;

- Synchronization of efforts; and
- Use of AGR and drilling reservists and guardsmen within the Integrated Division.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, HQDA and other agencies are currently involved in the AC/RC integration analysis as a part of the Total Army Analysis 2005. It is expected that an AC/RC initiatives group will be formed to assemble and track all ongoing and planned AC/RC initiatives. Parties responsible for implementing the AC/ARNG Integrated Division should coordinate closely with this group to ensure all applicable efforts are incorporated into the AC/ARNG Integrated Division implementation.

#### **10.6 COMMAND POSITIONS WITHIN THE AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISIONS.**

Any one of the alternatives selected for implementation will have a two star general as the division commander. In addition to the division commander, there may be as many as five other general officers assigned to the division, depending on the alternative selected for implementation and the ERBs comprising the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions (12 of the 15 ERBs are commanded by a general officer). The matrix below shows the maximum number of general officers that could potentially be assigned to the AC/ARNG Integrated Division for each alternative.

**Table 10-1 General Officers by Alternative**

	<b>Div Cdr</b>	<b>ADC(M)</b>	<b>ADC(S)</b>	<b>ERB Cdrs</b>	<b>Total</b>
Alternative 1	1	1	1	3	6
Alternative 2	1	0	0	3	4
Alternative 3	1	1	1	0	3

##### **10.6.1 Alternative 1**

Under this Alternative, the ERBs may not be required to reconfigure to an AOE division until post mobilization. Therefore, the ERBs in peacetime can retain their current command configuration. This places as many as 6 general officers in a single division - twice as many as are found in an AOE division. Under some circumstances, this may lead to confusion in chain of command responsibilities and pre mobilization training arrangements. In post mobilization, the division may be employed as either separate brigades - in which case the general officers may be needed for command; or as an AOE division with task organized brigades - in which case the brigade commanders would be colonels and the 3 general officers formerly in command of the ERBs become excess to the needs of the division.

#### *10.6.2 Alternative 2*

The pre and post mobilization configuration of this division does not change. The ERBs retain their configuration as ERBs and are employed as such. In this Alternative, the 4 general officers in the division may not be in excess of the needs of the division and its post mobilization requirements.

#### *10.6.3 Alternative 3*

Under this Alternative, the ERBs are reconfigured to AOE task organized brigades in pre mobilization. Depending on which ERBs are selected to become part of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division under this Alternative, there may be as many as 3 general officer positions that are freed up for alignment elsewhere within the ARNG.

### ***10.7 EVALUATING THE SUCCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION.***

Should Alternative 2 be selected for implementation, it is important that all future impacts be evaluated before progressing toward either Alternative 1 or Alternative 3. These impacts include, but are not limited to:

- Decisions made as a part of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and subsequent National Defense Panel review;
- Force XXI decisions;
- Army After Next (AAN) decisions;
- Changes to the National Military Strategy; and
- Lessons Learned from Alternative 2.

Consideration must also be given to what criteria will be used to evaluate and/or measure the success or failure of a given alternative. Previous efforts involved in restructuring divisions or testing division concepts may prove useful in formulating the criteria.




Figure 10-4 Potential Implementation Plan

## **Chapter Eleven CONCLUSIONS**

### ***11.1 OBJECTIVE.***

The objective is to collate and evaluate the findings developed in the previous chapters in order to arrive at conclusions upon which to base a recommendation for the Secretary of the Army as to the merits of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept and the most appropriate course of action to follow.

### ***11.2 APPROACH.***

The Study Director reviewed the findings and observations contained in each of the preceding chapters and compared each alternative design to the findings and with each other in order to determine a positive recommendation for the next phase of the study.

### ***11.3 ASSUMPTIONS.***

The assumptions used in the determination of the conclusions are the same as those for the remainder of the study.

### ***11.4 DATA SOURCES.***

The data sources are those found in Chapters 1 through 10 or the appropriate appendices. No additional material has been used.

### ***11.5 FINDINGS.***

#### ***11.5.1 General Comments.***

The primary task of the Study Director was to analyze the viability of the concept of an "Integrated AC/ARNG Division" and develop a recommendation on how to proceed. The assessment of the concept considered diverse subject issues and suggestions. The Study Director was also faced with several positions from the participants and associated constituencies that, initially, seemed contradictory and preventative. However, during the course of the study several issues were clarified

and, to some extent, resolved. The efforts within the scope of this study resulted in a two part finding:

- The concept of an Integrated AC/ARNG Division is viable; and
- Several issues must be resolved before a test of the feasibility of an Integrated AC/ARNG Division can be conducted. These issues can be resolved through negotiations between the ARSTAFF, the Force Provider, the ARNG and the appropriate states. The results would be codified in a MOA (in the near term) and considered for further inclusion into the regulatory base of the Army, ARNG and states (in the long term).

#### *11.5.2 Specific Comments.*

#### *DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS.*

A comparative analysis of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives against doctrinal publications, which provide the warfighting doctrine for each alternative when it is employed in a theater of operations, shows that each alternative can be supported by existing doctrine. FM 71-100, *Division Operations*, does not apply to Alternative 2 because the division command and control element above the enhanced brigade is a training organization only.

#### *ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS.*

The analytical review indicates that all three alternatives will work.

**Alternative 1** is the most complicated Alternative. It consists of an AC division HHC responsible for coordination and supervision of training activities of three assigned ERBs during peacetime. It also has a standard division base, decremented to the extent possible to account for redundancies contained within the assigned ERBs. In some cases, however, redundancies exist because certain elements of the division base are required for training purposes. The Alternative 1 organization has the advantage of preserving ERBs for separate missions and for peacetime command and control. However, it is more difficult to deploy as a division due to the need to reconfigure at time of mobilization and the need to administratively store redundant equipment.

**Alternative 2** is the simplest Alternative. It consists of an AC training (TDA) division HHC responsible for coordination and training activities of three assigned ERBs during peacetime, mobilization, and post mobilization to the point in time when the brigades deploy to a point of embarkation (either an APOE or and SPOE) for commitment to their stated wartime/OOTW missions. The

division TDA HHC never deploys, but remains available to operate a War Fighting Center (WFC) and to train follow-on forces. As a result, the division HHC has a non-standard configuration to meet training oversight requirements. Alternative 2 has the advantage of preserving the ERBs for separate missions and peacetime training.

**Alternative 3** consists of an AOE division design with an AC division HHC. The division is responsible for coordination and supervision of training activities during peacetime, mobilization, and post mobilization. When committed, the Alternative 3 division functions as a standard AOE division. Under some circumstances, the division as a whole may not be required to totally deploy, but only provide task organized brigades. The Alternative 3 division has the advantages of always training with habitually associated organizations, already being in a division configuration when mobilized for division missions, and not having redundancies in personnel or equipment. Its disadvantages are the loss of separate brigades to the state National Guard structures and the loss of six ERBs from the 15 identified in the base force established in the Bottom Up Review.

#### *STATUTORY, REGULATORY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DATA FLOW*

The results of the analysis shows that statutory and regulatory issues center on the authority of the division commander, the use of units within the division, and the allocation of funds. No legal show stoppers exist. However, there are differing views on how to implement the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept. The options identified in Chapter 5 and Appendix J make use of a memorandum of agreement between affected parties until such time as more permanent regulations can be published on the Federal side and more permanent agreements can be made between states and the Federal participants. The MOA must be developed between the interested parties prior to the initiation of any follow on test or activation action. The inability to develop a MOA would preclude implementation of the test or activation of any of the three alternatives.

#### *PRE MOBILIZATION TRAINING*

The examination of pre mobilization training requirements found that Section 1113, Title XI effectively outlines the pre mobilization training goals for each of the three alternative designs for the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions. Further examination found that the training strategy to accomplish these goals can be found in FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2 (*Reserve Component Training in America's Army*), Army Field Manual 25-100 (*Training the Force*), and Army Field Manual 25-101 (*Battle Focused Training*). Additionally, there appears to be no reason to exempt the ERBs from performing state missions, nor is there any

precedent or mechanism to accomplish such actions. Standard leader development requirements - Institutional Training, Organizational Experiences, and Self Development - appear to offer no major management obstacles for any of the three AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives.

### *POST MOBILIZATION TRAINING*

The post mobilization requirements of Alternative 2 are also well developed and documented in the same references mentioned for pre mobilization training. The lack of information on post mobilization training for Alternatives 1 and 3 required the RAND effort to develop post mobilization training requirements for ARNG divisions. RAND developed and analyzed three post mobilization training strategies for ARNG divisions. The three strategies were then subjected to review by senior Army trainers for comment. The RAND effort provides sound training strategies, to include identifying the time to train requirements, the resource requirements, and the risk assumed for each of the three strategies. Division training strategies range from a higher risk strategy that provides the first division in approximately M+132 days and the second division in approximately M+217 days to the more conservative strategy that provides both divisions simultaneously in M+239 days.

Selected CINCs - CINCUNC, CINCUSAREUR, and CINCCENT - were also queried about their possible concerns regarding post mobilization training times for the ERBs and the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions. All CINCs see utility and merit for Alternative 2. However, they stated that heavy forces arriving in theater after M+90 were of limited use to the warfight and provide limited value.

### *FORCE IMPLICATIONS*

ODCSOPS, War Plans Division used the results of the RAND study, the current DPG, the Total Army Analysis results (TAA03), and the United States Army Concepts Analysis transportation model (TRANSMO) to determine the impacts of producing AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions rather than ERBs. The results of this analysis are classified. The results do show that AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions arrive in theater to support the latter stages of the warfight for a dual MRC scenario. However, their arrival does not come without an associated cost - a delay in deployment of other units required for the warfight, and a larger CS/CSS tail required to doctrinally support a division in theater than the CS/CSS tail to doctrinally support ERBs. In addition, selection of certain alternatives and post mobilization training strategies will require adjustments to the current DPG and to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

### *RESOURCE ANALYSIS*

The resource analysis reviewed pre and post mobilization personnel requirements, procurement costs, and operating tempo (OPTEMPO) costs. Additionally, the resource analysis reviewed mission travel requirements. All three alternatives generate increased personnel requirements for implementation. Alternative 2 generates the least; Alternative 1 the most because of redundancy between the ERBs and the division base. In addition, Alternatives 1 and 3 generate additional post mobilization training support requirements caused by the division base. Procurement costs were the least for Alternative 2 because it only has a stylized division HHC; the other two alternatives have requirements for division base units and thus have greater equipment requirements. All three alternatives will also generate larger than usual mission travel budgets because of the geographic separation of the units within the AC/ARNG Integrated Division and the frequency of travel for the staff. Employment of AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions under Alternative 1 or 3 will doctrinally generate a Corp CS/CSS tail. An example is two Field Artillery brigades per division. The resourcing impact and decision should be resolved as a part of the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process should Alternative 1 or 3 be implemented.

### *IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES*

As the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study progressed toward maturity, it received significant exposure through the in-progress review briefing process. During these briefings, a number of concerns, recommendations, and alternative solutions were raised pertaining to the division HHC organization, structure, manning, e.g., basing and the alignment of the ERBs. Each concern/recommendation/solution had potential for future consideration, but was outside the scope of the study plan. These ideas were not evaluated but were collected and recorded so they can be revisited in the future as an AC/ARNG Integrated Division design is implemented. Among the areas addressed are:

- ERB alignment and division HHC type and location;
- Statutory and regulatory considerations;
- Funding streams for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division;
- Complementary methods of AC/RC integration;
- Command positions afforded to the ERBs in the event Alternatives 1 or 3 are selected; and
- Training support impacts of ERB selection.

Table 11-1 Conclusions

Even though there are issues that must be resolved prior to implementation and resources identified to support any of the three alternatives, no show stoppers exist to preclude the concept from being viable. The next step is selecting an alternative to stand up and test.
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## 11.6 ANALYTICAL EVALUATIONS

Within each of the seven areas addressed in the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study, each of the three alternative designs were objectively and subjectively evaluated and given a rating of GREEN, AMBER or RED.

- GREEN - No significant issues which preclude implementation.
- AMBER - Issues exist that impact implementation decision. Must be resolved prior to implementation.
- RED - Significant issues exist that would preclude any decision to implement (“Show Stoppers”).

### *DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS.*

The Doctrinal Analysis resulted in a finding of GREEN for all alternatives.

### *ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS.*

The Organizational Analysis resulted in a rating of GREEN for all alternatives.

### *STATUTORY, REGULATORY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DATA FLOW*

Even though, there are no legal show stoppers, the differing views on how to implement the concept has resulted in a finding of AMBER for all alternatives. The differences between the parties must be resolved prior to the initiation of any further test and or activation.

### *PRE MOBILIZATION TRAINING*

Since the pre mobilization training goals in Section 1113, Title XI are effectively outlined and the strategy to accomplish these goals is established in FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2 (*Reserve Component Training in America's Army*), Army Field Manual 25-100 (*Training the Force*), and Army Field Manual

25-101 (*Battle Focused Training*), the brigade level and below echelons are adequately covered. However some additional training publications must be developed for those alternatives containing a decremented division base. Accordingly, Alternative 2 is rated GREEN, while Alternatives 1 and 3 are rated AMBER.

#### *POST MOBILIZATION TRAINING*

The Post Mobilization training of the ERBs is well documented in regulation and plans. As Alternative 2 is an ERB option only, the rating is GREEN. However, the question of the divisional options required a separate analysis that was conducted by RAND. The RAND effort provides sound training strategies, to include identifying time to train requirements, the resource requirements, and the risk assumed for each of the three strategies. Since the requirements identified by RAND remain undefined, both Alternative 1 and 3 must, therefore, be rated AMBER.

#### *FORCE IMPLICATIONS*

Alternative 2 is the only alternative that is IAW the current DPG. As such, Alternative 2 is rated GREEN. DAMO-SSW utilized the results of the RAND study, the current DPG, the Total Army Analysis results, and the United States Army Concepts Analysis transportation model (TRANSMO) to determine the impacts of producing AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions rather than ERBs. In addition, selected CINCs were also queried. The selection of either Alternatives 1 or 3 will require adjustments to the current DPG and to the JSCP. These changes cause ratings of AMBER to be assigned to Alternatives 1 and 3.

#### *RESOURCE ANALYSIS*

Alternative 2 is the least cost intrusive and is considered to be GREEN. Both Alternative 1 and 3 are considered to have significant resource implications and are considered AMBER. The presence of some of ARNG force structure to mitigate those costs resulted in a show-stopper rating RED to be upgraded to AMBER.

#### *OVERALL*

The overall ratings are AMBER for Alternatives 1 and 3 and AMBER to GREEN for Alternative 2. If the Statutory and Regulatory issues can be resolved via the

MOA, then Alternative 2 becomes a wholly GREEN Alternative and should be considered for implementation and further analysis.

This study recognizes that other methods of AC/RC integration exist and should be considered. However, there is merit to the concept of an AC/ARNG Integrated Division. The concept provides a focused division HHC tailored to provide command, control and training oversight exclusively to three ERBs. The focused, smaller span of control, tailored headquarters, and an experienced, dedicated commander and staff provide improved training readiness and lessens the risk of not meeting deployment time lines. Additionally, the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept reduces the associated training distracters for the previously affiliated AC divisions. This provides the opportunity for a better trained total force and, therefore, reduces risk to the CINCs.

The 180 to 300 AC spaces for each of the division HHCs, up to 600 AC spaces if both are approved, appear to be worth the investment for a field evaluation of the concept. However, the additional costs for division base units, a higher OPTEMPO, and an increased EAD combat support tail mitigate against either Alternatives 1 and 3 as the evaluated element. It, therefore, makes sense to assess Alternative 2, especially considering the current DPG does not identify requirements for additional divisions.

The bottom line is the concept has sufficient merit to test if the implementation issues identified in this study are resolved. There is no reason, at present, to implement the more expensive alternatives. Standing up Alternative 2 provides the Army the opportunity to test the viability of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept through the lesser expensive method, resolve issues, and determine the value added.

## Chapter Twelve RECOMMENDATION

Even though there are issues that must be resolved prior to implementation, no show stoppers exist to preclude the concept from being viable. The next step is selecting an alternative to stand up and test. Figure 12-1 shows the study comparison of the three alternative designs for the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions. Based on the comparison of the alternatives, Alternative 2 emerges as the preferred Alternative because it:

- Is the least expensive - requires the fewest personnel and the least amount of equipment;
- Is the easiest to implement - only a division HHC must be formed;
- Meets the current DPG requirements - ERBs retain their current configuration;
- Facilitates future decisions - Alternative 2 allows transition to either Alternative 1 or Alternative 3 at some future date if required and appropriate; and
- Is executable in the near term.

	Doctrine	Organization	Statutory	Pre Mob Tng	Post Mob Tng	Force Implications	Resources	Overall
Alternative 1	G	G	A	A	A	A	A	A
Alternative 2	G	G	A	G	G	G	G	A/G
Alternative 3	G	G	A	A	A	A	A	A

**STATUTORY** - Must resolve command, funding and data transfer

**PRE/POST MOB TNG** - Alts 1 & 3 train both Bde and Div missions, Alt 2 Bde only

**FORCE IMP** - Alt 1(as DIV) & 3 delay later deploying forces, generate additional CS/CSS tail, and not IAW current DPG (Div deployment)

**RESOURCES\*** - Alt 1 & 3 require significant additional resources for the Div bases

**\*Note:** May be offset by existing ARNG Force Structure

Figure 12-1 Comparison of Alternatives for AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions

Selecting Alternative 2 for implementation demonstrates the Army's commitment to AC/RC integration - an area of Department of Defense and Congressional concern and has the potential to improve overall readiness of the ERBs and reduce the partnership impacts on AC units. Selection of Alternative 2 also allows the Army to incorporate lessons learned from implementation, the impacts from Force

XXI and Army After Next. the impacts from the ongoing QDR and other changing world events to be considered before migrating to either Alternative 1 or Alternative 3, if required or as appropriate.

The study further recommends the establishment of a process action team (PAT) comprised of representatives from FORSCOM, the ARSTAF, and the ARNG. The PAT would be charged with resolving implementation issues, negotiating the MOA which outlines the duties and responsibilities of the respective parties involved in implementing and testing Alternative 2, and investigating complementary methods of AC/ARNG integration. It is noted that while the AOE heavy division was used for analytical purposes to ascertain the viability of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division, the exact composition of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division is left to the discretion of the PAT. The AOE heavy division is *not* the only way to achieve an AC/ARNG Integrated Division.

### *DECISION*

On August 6, 1997, the Study Director presented a decision briefing to the Secretary of the Army and other principals on the viability of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept. The briefing outlined the major findings of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study, presented some implementation issues, and made a recommendation. Based on the study findings and the analysis and other discussion among the principals, the Secretary of the Army made a decision to:

- Stand up Alternative 2 (an Active Component headquarters with 3 ERBs) in the near term;
- Establish an implementation PAT lead by FORSCOM to resolve issues; and
- Transition to either Alternative 1 or Alternative 3 in the long term, if appropriate.

In addition, the Secretary of the Army issued guidance that:

- Requested that that all affected state adjutants general be involved in the implementation process;
- Reminded the parties that the CINCs are the ultimate users and must be kept informed of the results of the study and the implementation progress;
- Reiterated that the major strong point of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division is the process, and not the end state; and
- Strives to achieve the greatest and most useful form of AC/RC integration.

The Secretary of the Army thanked the ARNG for presenting the AC/ARNG Integrated Division proposal to the Army and he thanked TRADOC for their

effort in developing the concept and completing the detailed study. He highlighted that the process is clearly a path toward greater integration. "It will make a difference (to the Total Army.)"

In addition to the Secretary of the Army, other principal attendees at the 6 August 1997 decision briefing were:

- Chief of Staff, Army
- Vice Chief of Staff, Army
- Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs)
- Commander, FORSCOM
- Commander, TRADOC
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
- Director, National Guard Bureau
- Director, Army National Guard
- The Adjutant General, Ohio

The slides used for the Secretary of the Army Decision Briefing can be found at Appendix K. The slides are presented without explanation.

